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I. INTRODUCTION: EMERGING ROLE OF THE BRIC COUNTRIES 
The precise connection between intellectual property and 
economic development varies over time from country to country 
and region to region.1 For example, one cannot doubt that 
intellectual property laws played a major role in the United 
States development and economic growth over the past three 
                                                          
 1. See, e.g., Meir Pugatch, The Process of Intellectual Property Policy-Making in the 
21st CenturyShifting from a General Welfare Model to a Multi-Dimensional One, 31 
EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 307 (2009). See generally KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 23 (2000); MEIR P. PUGATCH, STOCKHOLM 
NETWORK, IF IT AINT BROKE, DONT FIX IT: A DISCUSSION PAPER ON THE BENEFITS OF THE 
VOLUNTARY MARKET-DRIVEN APPROACH TO INNOVATION (2008) ([I]nnovation both 
influences, and is influenced by, a number of exogenous or external factorssocial, 
cultural and demographic trends, for example.). 
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decades. Yet, the moment one digs deeper, one discovers that, 
until 1982, the United States had one of the developed worlds 
most pro-competitive patent laws (i.e., least protective); until 
1978, it had relatively weak copyright laws; and until the 1980s, 
it had an aggressively interventionist competition law along with 
a robust doctrine of patent misuse.2 Somehow, the U.S. economy 
managed to survive and thrive in this relatively low 
protectionist, highly competitive environment. 
Similarly, Japan, India, China, Korea, Malaysia, and Brazil 
all managed to attain relatively high levels of economic growth 
without strong intellectual property rights.3 The astounding 
success of the Indian pharmaceutical industry that began in the 
1970s was achieved by means of a state policy that largely 
prohibited the patenting of medicinal products as such.4 This 
phenomenon reminds us that intellectual property rights are but 
one component of overall economic growth; that different states 
have different factor endowments; and that in many countries, 
especially those at an early stage of development, a sound 
agricultural policy or a sound pro-competitive industrial policy 
with a supportive political and legal infrastructure are more 
likely to stimulate economic growth than intellectual property 
laws.5 
At the same time, we may confidently agree that countries 
such as China, India, Brazil, Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Argentina, Russia, South Africa, and many other emerging 
economies will not reach their full economic potential without 
                                                          
 2. See CHRISTOPHER MAY & SUSAN K. SELL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A 
CRITICAL HISTORY 13942 (2006); James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the 
Construction of the Public Domain, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 33, 
3740; Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of Private Knowledge 
Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS 
AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 
(K.E. Maskus & J.H. Reichman eds., 2005); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, The Intellectual 
PropertyAntitrust Interface, in 3 ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 1979, 198086 
(Wayne D. Collins ed., 2008) (examining the historic interplay between antitrust and 
intellectual property law and policy). 
 3. See, e.g., Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Role of India, China, Brazil and Other 
Emerging Economies in Establishing Access Norms for Intellectual Property and 
Intellectual Property Lawmaking 24, 11 (Intl Law & Justice Working Paper 2009/5, 
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1442785 (suggesting that some developing 
countries are now in a unique position to exercise their increasing influence to advance 
pro-access views and contribute to the harmonization and integration of international 
intellectual property norms). 
 4. See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski, Harmonization and Its Discontents: A Case Study of 
TRIPS Implementation in Indias Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2009). 
 5. See Daniel Gervais, Of Clusters and Assumptions: Innovation as Part of a Full 
TRIPS Implementation, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2353, 2371 (2009). 
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suitable intellectual property regimes.6 For example, 
policymakers in most Asian countries that are already 
committed to becoming players in the knowledge economy 
clearly understand they will not reach the frontiers of that 
economy,7 nor will they convert their economies intangible, 
nonrivalrous outputs into tradeable knowledge goods, without 
articulating appropriate intellectual property laws and policies, 
along with a whole set of interrelated economic and political 
foundations that are essential to maintaining a viable post-
industrial economy.8 To this end, Chinas third amendment of 
its Patent Law in 2008 expressly reflects the needs of 
development of China herself, which require the promotion 
of . . . independent innovation and the establishment of an 
innovation-oriented country.9 
The moment one looks at Asia as a regional group, one is 
struck by how much the IP scenario has changed over the past 
twenty-five years, i.e., since the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) countries began to press for 
higher, relatively harmonized worldwide IP standards under the 
aegis of what eventually became the TRIPS Agreement of 1994.10 
As many critics have observed, the TRIPS Agreement produced a 
regime that deliberately favored those OECD countries that 
                                                          
 6. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 6, 11; Gervais, supra note 5, at 236061.  
 7. UNITED NATIONS EDUC., SCI. & CULTURAL ORG. (UNESCO), TOWARDS 
KNOWLEDGE SOCIETIES 2756 (2005) [hereinafter TOWARDS KNOWLEDGE SOCIETIES]; see 
also Mary-Louise Kearney, UNESCO, Research in the Knowledge Society: Global and 
Local Dimensions, Concept Paper for the International Experts Workshop (Mar. 1921, 
2009), available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001821/182189e.pdf (discussing 
the benefits of and obstacles to obtaining access to knowledge in developing countries). 
 8. See generally Daniel Gervais, TRIPS and Development, in INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT 3 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 2007); Peter Yu, 
Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China Puzzle, in INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, supra, at 173, 195. 
 9. Xiaoqing Feng, The Interaction Between Enhancing the Capacity for Independent 
Innovation and Patent Protection: A Perspective on the Third Amendment to the Patent Law 
of the P.R. China, U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POLY, Spring 2009, at 1, 6; see also Andrea 
Wechsler, Intellectual Property in the P.R. China: A Powerful Economic Tool for Innovation 
and Development 42 (Max Planck Inst. for Intellectual Prop., Competition & Tax Law, 
Research Paper No. 09-02, 2008) (China continues to realize the importance of both the 
unhampered influx of knowledge and intellectual property into China and the promotion of 
domestic innovation . . . [and] it has come to embed its IP policy into the framework of an 
overall pro-innovation industrial policy which protects domestic S&T innovations.). 
 10. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 
Legal InstrumentsResults of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter 
TRIPS Agreement]. See generally Jerome H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of 
Intellectual Property Protection Under the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 23 (Carlos 
M. Correa & Abdulqawi A. Yusuf eds., 2d ed. 2008). 
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already possessed developed national systems of innovation and 
whose multinational companies owned plenty of patented high-
tech products to sell or manufacture around the world.11 There 
was a built-in disposition to favor big companies seeking rents 
from existing innovationsor those in the pipelineat the cost of 
making future innovations more difficult, especially for less 
technically advanced countries.12 
Robert Ostergard recently described the development 
dilemma that TRIPS posed for poorer countries in the following 
terms:  
[I]f they open their domestic markets to trade, they face 
political and economic pressure to protect foreign IP; if they 
protect foreign IP, they create conditions that force them to 
abandon their goal to obtain IP as inexpensively as 
possible.13  
Of course, these IP concessions were partly offset by trade 
concessions in other areas (side payments), such as textiles, 
agriculture, and traditionally manufactured goods, a calculus 
that worked differently for different countries. 
Yet, as often happens in international law, efforts to rig a 
regime for short-term advantages may turn out, in the medium- 
and long-term, to boomerang against those who pressed hardest 
for its adoption. In my very first article on this subject, I warned 
that by reaching for high levels of international protection (that 
could not change in response to less-favorable domestic 
circumstances), technology-exporting countries risked fostering 
conditions that could erode their technological superiority and 
resulting terms of trade over time.14 As more technology-
importing countries discovered and cultivated their own 
                                                          
 11. See, e.g., MAY & SELL, supra note 2, at 187; Gervais, supra note 5, at 235758. 
 12. See PETER DRAHOS WITH JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO 
OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? 12526 (2002); Jerome H. Reichman & Rochelle 
Cooper Dreyfuss, Harmonization Without Consensus: Critical Reflections on Drafting a 
Substantive Patent Law Treaty, 57 DUKE L.J. 85, 9496 (2007) (reasoning that high rents 
charged by technology exporters hamper developing countries abilities to preserve their 
own comparative advantages). 
 13. Robert L. Ostergard, Jr., Economic Growth and Intellectual Property Rights 
Protection: A Reassessment of the Conventional Wisdom, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 
TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 8, at 115, 155. 
 14. J.H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in International Trade: Opportunities and 
Risks of a GATT Connection, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNATL L. 747, 891 (1989). For evidence 
that this inversion is occurring within the Indian pharmaceutical industry, see 
Kapczynski, supra note 4 (noting that, instead of pushing Indian competitors out of the 
low-value Indian markets, multilateral pharmaceutical firms may have also pushed 
Indian companies into the U.S. and EU markets on which their profits much more 
substantially rely). 
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innovative strengths and capacities, they would benefit both 
from the worldwide system of incentives and protections that 
the TRIPS Agreement had established, as well as from location 
and other endowment factors,15 at the expense of leading 
developed countries that took their own technical superiority for 
granted.  
In short, given the incipient transnational system of 
innovation16 that had begun to emerge from the TRIPS 
Agreement, there was every reason to expect that the BRIC 
group as a whole,17 and many other emerging economies, would 
gradually become major competitors in the knowledge economy 
itself, with growing potential to match and challenge the 
advanced OECD countries pre-existing comparative advantages 
in this area.18 
That this transformation has been occurring all around us is 
too solidly evidenced for us to review here in detail.19 What this 
Article will focus on, instead, is how those developing countries 
with growing technological prowess should accommodate their 
own national systems of innovation to the worldwide intellectual 
property regime emerging in the post-TRIPS period, with a view 
to maximizing global economic welfare in the foreseeable future.20 
II. AVOIDING PROTECTIONIST EXCESSES 
High-protectionist visions of intellectual property law have 
become a kind of latter-day religion promoted by the special 
interests that have long dominated the political scene in the 
United States, the European Union (EU), and Japan.21 The BRIC 
                                                          
 15. See Yu, supra note 8, at 17679. 
 16. Maskus & Reichman, supra note 2, at 44. 
 17. BRIC refers to those developing countries with fast-growing economies, 
especially Brazil, Russia, India, and China. See Dominic Wilson & Roopa Purushothaman, 
Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050, at 3 (Goldman Sachs, Global Economics Paper No. 
99, 2003), available at http://www2.goldmansachs.com/ideas/brics/book/99-dreaming.pdf. 
 18. Maskus & Reichman, supra note 2, at 44; see also Jerome H. Reichman, Richard 
Lillich Memorial Lecture: Nurturing a Transnational System of Innovation, 16 J. 
TRANSNATL L. & POLY 143, 14748 (2007). 
 19. See Carsten Fink & Keith E. Maskus, Why We Study Intellectual Property 
Rights and What We Have Learned, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT 1, 7
8 (Carsten Fink & Keith E. Maskus eds., 2005); Wechsler, supra note 9 (case of China); 
Ricardo Machado Ruiz, Technological Leadership and Market Leadership: Expected 
Convergences or Structural Differences?, Paper Presented at the International Seminar 
INCT-PPED: Promoting Strategic Responses to Globalization, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (Nov. 
5, 2009) (case of Brazil). 
 20. See Gervais, supra note 5, at 236171 (emphasizing adaptation problems of 
national systems of innovation and citing authorities). 
 21. See, e.g., DRAHOS WITH BRAITHWAITE, supra note 12, at 1112; MICHAEL P. 
RYAN, KNOWLEDGE DIPLOMACY 8589 (1998) (noting the influence of special interest 
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countries in particular will thus need to inoculate themselves 
against succumbing to these same high-protectionist delusions 
while there is still time.  
If it remains true that a country cannot play in the 
knowledge economy without suitable intellectual property rights 
(IPRs),22 experience in many OECD countries is demonstrating 
that badly configured, unbalanced, over-protectionist IP regimes 
gradually stifle innovation by making inputs to future innovation 
too costly and too cumbersome to sustain over time.23 Such 
regimes also enable large corporations that are sometimes 
slothful innovators to accumulate pools of cross-licensed patents 
that create barriers to entry for the truly innovative small- and 
medium-sized firms.24 Properly designed IPRs do, however, 
protect innovative small- and medium-sized firms from the 
predatory practices of their larger competitors. 
It is widely recognized that the patent system in the United 
States is emerging from a period of crisis. Among other problems, 
the cumulative costs of litigation generated by a plethora of weak 
patents that increasingly pervaded the upstream research 
dimension threaten to exceed the aggregate returns from 
patented innovation as such, especially in the field of information 
technologies.25 There is still no consensus about how to reform the 
                                                          
groups on U.S. bilateral intellectual property diplomacy and citing specific examples). But 
see generally EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE (2007) (evaluating 
four competing scenarios for the evolution of patent law regimes with very different and 
conflicting premises and outcomes).  
 22. See Gervais, supra note 8, at 3336; Wechsler, supra note 9, at 4243 
(stressing that Chinas new patent law was not the outcome of external pressure but 
was intended to allow Chinas domestic firms to compete effectively with their foreign 
counterparts). 
 23. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 218 (2008) (describing the 
prohibitive costs of obtaining and litigating patents); JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: 
ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND 113 (2008); Reichman & Dreyfuss, supra note 12, 
at 10208; see also Jerome H. Reichman & Ruth L. Okediji, Empowering Digitally 
Integrated Scientific Research: The Pivotal Role of Copyright Laws Limitations and 
Exceptions 910 (Draft Version May 4, 2009), Paper Presented at the Fordham 
Conference on Intellectual Property Law and Policy, Cambridge University (Apr. 15, 
2009); at the UNCTAD/ICTSD side event, Meeting of the Committee on Copyrights and 
Neighboring Rights, World Intellectual Property Organization, Geneva, Switzerland (May 
29, 2009); and at the Meeting of the Task Force on Intellectual Property Rights and 
Development (IDP), University of Manchester (June 2223, 2009). 
 24. See, e.g., Geertrui van Overwalle, Of Thickets, Blocks and Gaps. Designing Tools 
to Resolve Obstacles in the Gene Patents Landscape, in GENE PATENTS AND 
COLLABORATIVE LICENSING MODELS 383 (Geertrui van Overwalle ed., 2009); Carl Shapiro, 
Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in 
INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 1, 119, 13031 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001).  
 25. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 23, at 218; MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK 
ECONOMY 5253 (2008); ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS 
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patent system, despite broad agreement that reforms are needed. 
As time passes, the demands of different industries become more 
contradictory and conflictual, particularly with regard to the 
information technology and biotechnology sectors.26 For these and 
other reasons, the European Patent Office has expressed concerns 
about the uncertain future of the world patent system.27 
None of these domestic tensions deterred either the 
United States Trade Representative (USTR) or the European 
Commission (EC) from demanding that the rest of the world 
adopt a proposed Substantive Patent Law Treaty that, at the 
international level, would have locked in place most of the very 
unsolved problems that confront the domestic system of 
innovation in the United States.28 The rest of the world might 
logically ask which version of U.S. patent law the USTR now 
seeks to export, given that the U.S. Supreme Court has so 
profoundly changed it in a series of recent cases.29 By the same 
token, one may also ask why certain Asian patent offices 
blindly supported these same proposals for a further upward 
                                                          
DISCONTENTS 45 (2004). Studies by the Federal Trade Commission and the National 
Academy of Sciences have also confirmed the diminishing returns that an unbalanced 
patent system has been producing in the United States. HELLER, supra, at 65. 
 26. Reichman & Dreyfuss, supra note 12, at 10304. 
 27. See EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note 21, at 811 (evaluating four 
competing scenarios for the evolution of patent law regimes with very different and 
conflicting premises and outcomes); see also Paul Edward Geller, An International Patent 
Utopia?, 25 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 515 (2003). 
 28. See, e.g., World Intell. Prop. Org. [WIPO], Standing Comm. on the Law of 
Patents, Report, at 45, 1921, WIPO Doc. SCP/10/11 (June 1, 2005); WIPO, Standing 
Comm. on the Law of Patents, Information on Certain Recent Developments in Relation to 
the Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT), at 13, WIPO Doc. SCP/10/8 (Mar. 17, 
2004) (discussing the efforts of the standing committee to draft a Substantive Patent Law 
Treaty that can be quickly adopted and later supplemented once consensus is reached on 
controversial provisions). 
 29. See, e.g., Quanta Computer, Inc., v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2122 (2008) 
(holding that the doctrine of patent exhaustion applies to the sale of components of a 
patented system); MedImmune, Inc., v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 12425 (2007) 
(holding that a patent licensee does not have to terminate its license agreement before it 
can seek a declaratory judgment that the patent is invalid); KSR Intl Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 
550 U.S. 398, 42628 (2007) (expanding the rules governing the inquiry into whether a 
patent claim is obvious in light of prior art, admonishing that such an analysis must 
not be confined within a test or formulation too constrained to serve its purpose); 
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 44143 (2007) (holding that patent 
infringement occurs when one supplies a patented inventions components from the 
United States and the product is reproduced; however, this rule does not apply to 
software exported but not installed overseas); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 
U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (holding that the generally applicable four-factor test for permanent 
injunctive relief applies to disputes arising under Patent Act); see also In re Bilski, 545 
F.3d 943, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 
2735 (2009) (holding the machine-or-transformation test to be the applicable test for 
determining patent eligibility of process claims in business method patent 
applications). 
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ratcheting of international patent norms. It was as if their 
governments were asking the other OECD countries, Please 
give us all your insoluble problems and contradictions as soon 
as possible, so we can undermine our own national systems of 
innovation, too.30 
Of course, the more that high- and middle-income developing 
countries become players in the knowledge economy, the more 
they share some of the fears and risks that usually underlie 
demands for higher levels of protection by powerful sectors of the 
advanced technology-exporting countries. For example, Asian 
entrepreneurs want their own exports of knowledge goods 
protected in the developing countries whose markets they 
increasingly penetrate through foreign direct investment (FDI), 
licensing, or sales of high-tech products. They also want to 
maintain flows of FDI and market-driven technology transfer 
into their own countries, in order to bolster their growing 
technological capacities. 
Yet, such concerns do not necessarily add up to a compelling 
case for higher levels of international intellectual property 
protection. On the contrary, the TRIPS Agreement itself provided 
an unprecedented platform of IP protection for exports after 
2000,31 and there is little evidence that this platform remains 
insufficient for the needs of Asian exporters, or for those of other 
emerging economies for the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, the 
relation between FDI and IPRs itself remains ambiguous, given 
that OECD technology exporters need entry into emerging 
economies as much as these economies need FDI and market-
driven technology transfer from the OECD countries.32 
                                                          
 30. For the view that transnational legal culture may link developing country 
patent offices into epistemic communities detached from broader policy considerations, 
see Kapczynski, supra note 4. See also CAROLYN DEERE, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME 
31420 (2009) (studying the sources of the wide variation found in developing countries 
use of TRIPS flexibilities and intellectual property enforcement in general). 
 31. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 65.2 (setting the year 2000 as the end 
of the transition period for developing countries). For pharmaceuticals, the effective 
transition period ended in 2005. Id. art. 65.4. For some of the thirty-two least-developed 
countries, the transition period for patents in general need not end until 2013 and for 
pharmaceuticals, until 2016. Id. art. 66.1; World Trade Organization, Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 20, 2001), 41 I.L.M. 755 
(2002) [hereinafter Doha Public Health Declaration]; Council for Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, Extension of the Transition Period Under Article 66.1 of the 
TRIPS Agreement for Least-Developed Country Members for Certain Obligations with 
Respect to Pharmaceutical Products, IP/C/25 (July 1, 2002); Council for Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Extension of the Transition Period under Article 
66.1 for Least-Developed Country Members, IP/C/40 (Nov. 30, 2005). 
 32. See Yu, supra note 8, at 17780 (emphasizing that stronger IP protection may 
not be necessary to attract FDI for countries that possess large and dynamic markets). 
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In China, India, and Brazil, moreover, knowledge economy 
skills and capacities have apparently reached the point where the 
stimulating effects of IPRs will influence different sectors and 
stakeholders quite differently, depending on the extent to which 
they are still driven by imitation-related innovation or 
investments in basic, or at least relatively original, R&D.33 
Increasingly, tensions arise between those who demand relatively 
strong patent protection for, say, research-driven pharmaceuticals, 
and those who demand a more forgiving, pro-competitive approach 
favoring generic pharmaceutical producers and exporters.34 In 
either case, how to protect cumulative and sequential innovation
as distinct from path-breaking innovationbecomes an ever more 
pressing problem as more small- and medium-sized firms acquire 
a taste and capacity for such innovation.35 
A parallel set of problems that the BRIC countries and other 
emerging economies increasingly face is how to adjust the 
shifting relations between private and public goods. Education, 
public health, agricultural improvement, scientific research, and 
other important areas are still heavily dependent on the public 
sector in most of these countries. Yet international intellectual 
property rights may impede the acquisition of scientific36 and 
educational materials;37 essential medicines;38 and seeds, stocks, 
                                                          
 33. See, e.g., id. at 18184 (discussing the relationship between FDI and IPRs in 
Chinas economic system); Kapczynski, supra note 4 (case of Indian pharmaceutical 
industries); Machado Ruiz, supra note 19; see also Pedro Nicoletti Mizukami & Ronaldo 
Lemos, From Free Software to Free Culture: The Emergence of Open Business, in ACCESS 
TO KNOWLEDGE IN BRAZIL 25, 2932 (Lea Shaver ed., 2008) (describing the relationship 
between FDI and IPRs in Brazils economic system). 
 34. See, e.g., Janice M. Mueller, The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous 
Transformation of Indias Patent System and the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical 
Innovation, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 491, 53941 (2007) (noting the divergent views of the 
pharmaceutical companies in India). 
 35. See, e.g., Reichman & Dreyfuss, supra note 12, at 11820. 
 36. See, e.g., Reichman & Okediji, supra note 23, at 2930 (arguing that broad 
exceptions for scientific uses are needed under current IP rules); J.H. Reichman & Paul F. 
Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons for Scientific Data in a Highly 
Protectionist Intellectual Property Environment, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 
2003, at 315, 46162; Jacques Warcoin, Patent Tsunami in the Field of Genetic 
Diagnostics. A Patent Practitioners View, in GENE PATENTS AND COLLABORATIVE 
LICENSING MODELS, supra note 24, at 331. See generally BOYLE, supra note 23. 
 37. Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property from Below: Copyright and Capability 
for Education, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 803, 82129 (2007); Ruth L. Okediji, Sustainable 
Access to Copyrighted Digital Information Works in Developing Countries, in 
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, supra note 2, at 142, 18485. 
 38. Frederick M. Abbott & Jerome H. Reichman, The Doha Rounds Public Health 
Legacy: Strategies for the Production and Diffusion of Patented Medicines Under the 
Amended TRIPS Provisions, 10 J. INTL ECON. L. 921, 928 (2007); Kevin Outterson, 
Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation in International Prescription 
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and fertilizers needed for economic growth.39 The extent to which 
these same types of impediments will adversely affect the 
development and dissemination of environmental technologies 
still remains to be seen.40 
Even with regard to the role of public-sector investment in 
basic research, which has been crucial in the most developed 
countries, there remains great uncertainty about the kind of 
regulatory regimes needed to ensure an appropriate social return 
from publicly funded or publicly generated research initiatives.41 
III. DESIGNING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS 
FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
As the high- and middle-income developing countries seek to 
strengthen their own national systems of innovation, they must 
decide how to address the challenges posed by a now highly 
articulated worldwide intellectual property system. This task 
requires policy decisions affecting the growth of a knowledge 
economy, rather than an economy based on physical, capital, or 
                                                          
Drug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POLY, L. & ETHICS 193 (2005). 
 39. Michael Blakeney, Stimulating Agricultural Innovation, in INTERNATIONAL 
PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY REGIME, supra note 2, at 367, 381; Robert E. Evenson, Agricultural Research and 
Intellectual Property Rights, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF 
TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, supra note 2, at 188, 
21213; Timothy Swanson & Timo Goeschl, Diffusion and Distribution: The Impacts on Poor 
Countries of Technological Enforcement Within the Biotechnology Sector, in INTERNATIONAL 
PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY REGIME, supra note 2, at 669, 67475; see also Michael Halewood, Agriculture and 
the Global Crop Commons, Paper Presented at the Task Force on Intellectual Property 
Rights and Development, Manchester, United Kingdom (June 23, 2009). 
 40. See, e.g., Frederick M. Abbott, Innovation and Technology Transfer to Address 
Climate Change: Lessons from the Global Debate on Intellectual Property and Public 
Health 2728 (Intl Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable Dev., Issue Paper No. 24, 2009), 
available at http://ictsd.org/downloads/2009/07/innovation-and-technology-transfer-to-
address-climate-change.pdf; Jerome Reichman, Arti K. Rai, Richard G. Newell & 
Jonathan B. Wiener, Intellectual Property and Alternatives: Strategies for Green 
Innovation 78 (Chatham House Energy, Envt & Dev. Program Paper, Preliminary 
Working Paper No. 08/03, 2008); Keith E. Maskus & Ruth L. Okediji, Intellectual 
Property Rights and International Technology Transfer to Address Climate Change: 
Risks, Opportunities, and Policy Options 1617 (Nov. 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on 
file with Houston Law Review). 
 41. See, e.g., Bhaven N. Sampat, The Bayh-Dole Model in Developing Countries: 
Reflections on the Indian Bill on Publicly Funded Intellectual Property (United Nations 
Conference on Trade & Dev., Intl Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable Dev., Policy Brief No. 5, 
2009); Anthony D. So et al., Is Bayh-Dole Good for Developing Countries? Lessons from 
the US Experience, 6 PLOS BIOLOGY 2078, 208082 (2008); Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. 
Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 289, 31314 (arguing that funding agencies should be 
given more authority over universities to restrict patenting of publicly funded 
research). 
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natural resources, which have relatively little to do with 
intellectual property laws as such.42  
To the extent that intellectual property laws do play an 
ancillary but important role, there are, roughly speaking, two 
different approaches on the table. One is to play it safe by 
sticking to time-tested IP solutions implemented in OECD 
countries, with perhaps a relatively greater emphasis on the 
flexibilities still permitted under TRIPS (and not overridden by 
relevant FTAs).43 The other approach is to embark upon a more 
innovative and even experimental path, with a view to addressing 
and perhaps solving the very problems that the advanced 
technology-exporting countries currently find so daunting.44 
A. From Fair Followers to Counter-Harmonization45 
Most technical assistance experts and many academics take 
the view that developing countries should stick to time-tested IP 
solutions while exploiting available exceptions and limitations 
recognized by developed countries. This approach affords the 
advantages of requiring relatively modest lawyering inputs 
(although it still requires more lawyering than one might 
think46); it may reduce internal debate about appropriate 
solutions; and it may deflect political and economic pressures 
from powerful countries whose own prior practices cast a 
                                                          
 42. See, e.g., Gervais, supra note 5, at 236171 (discussing strategies for research 
and education for the clustering or networking of centers of innovation, for steering 
innovation in suitable directions, for inculcating social norms conducive to innovation, 
and for a suitable regulatory infrastructure); Leonardo Burlamaqui, IPRs and 
Development Policy: From Intellectual Property to Knowledge Governance, Paper 
Presented at the International Seminar INCT-PPED: Promoting Strategic Responses to 
Globalization, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (Nov. 5, 2009). 
 43. See Daniel J. Gervais, Epilogue: A TRIPS Implementation Toolbox, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 8, at 527, 52930; J.H. 
Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition Under the TRIPS 
Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INTL L. & POL. 11, 1316 (1997) (recommending strategies for 
developing and developed countries to implement TRIPS differently); see also DEERE, 
supra note 30, at 2. 
 44. See Reichman & Dreyfuss, supra note 12, at 93, 10208; see also John F. Duffy, 
Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685, 69192 
(2002). The notion of nation states as conductors of experimental IP laboratories goes 
back to Stephen Ladass discussion of the Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property (1883). See 1 STEPHEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND 
RELATED RIGHTS 913 (1975). 
 45. Professor Kapczynski has coined the felicitous term, Counter-Harmonization, 
which I gratefully adopt here. See Kapczynski, supra note 4. 
 46. See Gervais, supra note 43, at 52931 (providing examples of bilateral 
agreements that, while adopting TRIPS norms, require nation-specific variations); 
Carlos M. Correa, TRIPS and TRIPS-Plus Protection and Impacts in Latin America, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 8, at 221, 225. 
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comforting shadow.47 
While this strategy seems politically expedient, Professor 
Dreyfuss and I remain skeptical for one main reason. At the end 
of the day, discreetly following in the technology-exporting 
countries IP footsteps will merely bring the high- and middle-
income developing countries face to face with the serious 
problems that the OECD countries have themselves failed to 
solve. It will place everyone in an equally unsatisfactory position, 
without having enhanced the governance skills of developing 
countries and without enriching the incipient transnational 
system of innovation with much-needed empirical evidence about 
alternative IP solutions to an array of apparently intractable 
problems. A deliberate policy of counter-harmonization, 
instead, could reduce the collective administrative costs of 
adopting an alternative patent regime, create a transnational 
counter-culture, and increase the costs . . . of extralegal 
retaliation.48 
Consider, for example, the choking and blocking effects that 
a proliferation of patents rooted in low nonobviousness standards 
increasingly produced for the software and, arguably, biotech 
industries in the United States and elsewhere.49 This 
phenomenon elicits pressures for quality patents that would 
                                                          
 47. Cf. Laurence R. Helfer, Karen J. Alter & M. Florencia Guerzovich, Islands of 
Effective International Adjudication: Constructing an Intellectual Property Rule of Law in 
the Andean Community, 103 AMER. J. INTL L. 1, 1636 (2009) (evidencing intense IP 
pressures on Latin American countries and collective response by the Andean Group); 
Robert C. Bird, Developing Nations and the Compulsory License: Maximizing Access to 
Essential Medicines While Minimizing Investment Side Effects, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 
209, 219 (2009) (stressing retaliatory pressures on developing countries that adopt 
compulsory licensing schemes in order to maximize public health benefits under current 
IP regimes). 
 48. Kapczynski, supra note 4; see also Reichman & Dreyfuss, supra note 12, at 121. 
Professor Gervais observes that many developing countries also want a system that is 
simpler than some of the doctrines in more technologically advanced countries, although 
he concedes that complexity is less of a problem for BRIC countries and other emerging 
economies. E-mail from Daniel Gervais, Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law 
School, to Jerome Reichman, Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law (Sept. 14, 
2009) (on file with Author).  
 49. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Noncompliance, Nonenforcement, Nonproblem? 
Rethinking the Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1059, 1079 (2008) 
(evaluating the argument that upstream patents may prevent projects in the biomedical 
field from getting off the ground); M.A. Heller & R.S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter 
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 699 (1998) 
(recognizing the increased cost associated with bundling patent licenses together); Arti K. 
Rai, John R. Allison & Bhaven N. Sampat, University Software Ownership and Litigation: 
A First Examination, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1519, 1554 (2009) (arguing that certain university-
owned patents allowed the right holders to extract rents and perhaps even holdup 
development efforts); see also Warcoin, supra note 36, at 331, 33233. 
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presumably result from higher nonobviousness standards,50 and 
the U.S. Supreme Court has recently taken a first step in this 
direction,51 pending further legislative reforms on the table.52 But 
higher nonobviousness standards, without more, will also expose 
costly cumulative and sequential innovation to free-riding forms 
of market failure, which was the risk that induced the Federal 
Circuit to lower its nonobviousness standard in the first place.53 
From this perspective, both the U.S. and foreign experiences 
reveal a cyclical or pendular shifting between states of under- 
and over-protection,54 without policymakers ever having seriously 
addressed the underlying question of how appropriately to 
protect cumulative and sequential innovation at the core of much 
present-day technological progress.55 This same question has now 
begun to surface in countries such as India and China.56 For 
                                                          
 50. See, e.g., HELLER, supra note 25, at 65 (outlining the Federal Trade Commission 
and National Academy of Sciencess recommendation for reforming and strengthening 
nonobviousness standards). 
 51. See id. at 6566 ([T]he Court raised the bar for obviousness . . . and reduced 
the ease with which patent holders can threaten other innovators with business-killing 
injunctions. (citing KSR Intl Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007))); see also In re 
Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 997 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 
129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009) (revising eligibility criteria for business method patents). 
 52. Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 610, 111th Cong.; Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 
1260, 111th Cong. However, legislative efforts to further refine the nonobviousness 
standard are no longer apparent in the pending bills, after the Supreme Courts decision 
in KSR. See generally Jay Thomas, Keynote Address at the Seventh Annual Hot Topics in 
Intellectual Property Law Symposium, Duke University School of Law, Durham, North 
Carolina: Progressive Patent Policy in the Post-Reform Era (Feb. 29, 2008). 
 53. See J.H. Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in 
Subpatentable Innovation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1743, 177276 (2000); see also Douglas Gary 
Lichtman, The Economics of Innovation: Protecting Unpatentable Goods, 81 MINN. L. REV. 
693 (1997) (demonstrating difficulties of recouping development costs under current 
competitive conditions). 
 54. J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2519 (1994) [hereinafter Reichman, Hybrids]; J.H. Reichman, 
Charting the Collapse of the PatentCopyright Dichotomy: Premises for a Restructured 
International Intellectual Property System, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 475, 515 (1995). 
 55. See J.H. Reichman, Saving the Patent Law from Itself: Informal Remarks 
Concerning the Systemic Problems Afflicting Developed Intellectual Property Regimes, in 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 289, 295301 (F. 
Scott Kieff & John M. Olin eds., 2003) (suggesting that an alternative set of liability rules 
that requires second-comers to compensate first-comer improvers is necessary to protect 
cumulative innovation). 
 56. Janice M. Mueller, Biotechnology Patenting in India: Will Bio-Generics Lead a 
Sunrise Industry to Bio-Innovation?, 76 UMKC L. REV. 437, 446 (2007) (detailing Indias 
efforts to promote biotechnology research through intellectual property protection, 
including the creation of a Biotechnology Patent Facilitating Cell aimed at facilitating the 
filing of patent applications); Janice M. Mueller, Taking TRIPS to IndiaNovartis, 
Patent Law, and Access to Medicines, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 541, 542 (2007) [hereinafter 
Mueller, Taking TRIPS to India] (highlighting increased patent protection measures 
taken by India since becoming a WTO member and resulting concerns); R.A. MASHELKAR 
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example, efforts to codify a relatively stiff standard of 
nonobviousness in the new Indian patent law were self-
consciously aimed at freeing up space for Indias thriving generic 
pharmaceutical industry.57 But these same efforts elicited 
complaints that Indias adoption of stiff eligibility standards 
would deprive the more research-driven pharmaceutical sector of 
sufficient incentives to invest in derivative applications of 
medicines initially developed abroad.58  
Besides an appropriately selective nonobviousness standard, 
in other words, India and similarly situated developing countries 
need an appropriately designed domestic regime that stimulates 
investment in cumulative and sequential innovation. Such a 
regime must also avoid creating barriers to entry or unduly 
hindering the transformation of todays technological outputs 
into inputs for tomorrows follow-on applications.59 
Of course, the traditionalists would respond by 
recommending greater use of utility model laws,60 and there has 
been a trend towards enacting such laws in the developing 
countries, including China.61 But the limits and weaknesses of 
patent-like utility model laws have been well documented since 
the 1970s at least, as are their inherent logical and economic 
contradictions, even if such regimes often prove better than 
nothing.62 Moreover, the Japanese experience suggests that 
advantages accruing from the use of utility models to surround 
foreign patents with tripwires of small-scale blocking effects tend 
                                                          
ET AL., REPORT OF THE TECHNICAL EXPERT GROUP ON PATENT LAW ISSUES (2009), 
available at http://www.patentoffice.nic.in (expressing concerns that high standards for 
judging nonobviousness will adversely affect cumulative innovation); see also Yu, supra 
note 8, at 19597 (noting that China initially overhauled its IPR system for admittance 
into the WTO). 
 57. Mueller, Taking TRIPS to India, supra note 56, at 541. 
 58. See, e.g., id. (highlighting the controversy surrounding the Indian Patent 
Offices rejection of Gleevecs patent application for a leukemia drug); MASHELKAR ET AL., 
supra note 56. 
 59. See generally Reichman, supra note 53 (suggesting alternative intellectual 
property protection approaches that would deter free-riding appropriation of small-scale 
innovations without diminishing access to small-scale technical knowhow). 
 60. See Reichman, Hybrids, supra note 54, at 245759 (explaining that utility 
model laws are designed to provide shorter term protection than patent laws through 
weaker nonobviousness standards and a narrower scope of protection); see also 
Lichtman, supra note 53 (advocating use of state sui generis regimes for a similar 
purpose). 
 61. Lulin Gao, The Third Amendment of Patent Law and Its Implementation 
Regulations in China, Paper Presented at the Second Global Forum on Intellectual 
Property, Singapore Academy of Intellectual Property Law (Jan. 89, 2009); see also Feng, 
supra note 9, at 19 (stressing limited innovation ability in China and the corresponding 
need to encourage invention creation of utility models).  
 62. See Reichman, Hybrids, supra note 54, at 2459 (citing authorities). 
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to peter out once the country relying on this tactic shifts its own 
domestic emphasis to relatively basic research.63 Sooner or later, 
utility model laws thus merely re-propose the same fundamental 
tensions that arise when too many patents cluster around the 
same rapidly developing technologies, each of which is dependent 
on preceding innovation and may stimulate equally dependent 
successive applications.64 
In other words, the clear boundaries between property rights 
that are a presupposed necessary condition for efficient trading of 
knowledge goods have become inherently blurred and 
overlapping as a consequence of the patent laws struggle to keep 
abreast of the changing conditions of technological progress.65 
Why should the BRIC countries, for example, not address this 
and other related problems head on, instead of falling into the 
same old traps and pitfalls that undermine systems of innovation 
in the most developed countries?66 
That the traditionally structured OECD innovation 
framework has become increasingly brittle over time67 appears 
from even a quick review of its three main premises: 
(1) Upstream scientific research, primarily theoretical in 
nature, was to remain immune from IPRs and to be 
regulated by the sharing norms of Mertonian science;68 
(2) Routine innovation (largely cumulative and sequential 
in nature) was primarily protected as know-how by 
trade secret laws, which established a vast semi-
commons accessible to all routine engineers willing to 
reverse-engineer by honest means, while also providing 
investors with natural lead time;69 
                                                          
 63. See id. at 245559. 
 64. See Eisenberg, supra note 49, 106364; Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic 
Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917 (2005). 
 65. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 23, at 4647; Eisenberg, supra note 49, at 
107684 (discussing the possible dampening impact of patents and the accompanying due 
diligence on research especially in industrial settings); Reichman & Dreyfuss, supra note 
12, at 10304. 
 66. Cf. Feng, supra note 9, at 15 (observing that one aim of Chinas patent laws is to 
define the space where the public is free to exploit technology for invention-creations). 
 67. Geoffrey Yu, Remarks at the Second Global Forum on Intellectual Property, 
Singapore Academy of Intellectual Property Law (Jan. 89, 2009). 
 68. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Property Rights and the Norms of Science in 
Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 18184 (1987); Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating 
Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. 
REV. 77, 8991 (1999). 
 69. Reichman, supra note 55, at 289, 29193; see also Lichtman, supra note 53, at 
72728 (stressing the chronic inability of lead time to recoup R&D costs). 
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(3) Legal monopolies were to be bestowed only on significant 
inventions, beyond the reach of routine engineers, while 
competition rooted in legally protected lead time and 
other comparative advantages drove the innovation 
process.70 
Today, instead, universities aggressively patent government-
funded research results.71 Many countries protect even scientific 
databases as such,72 and there is no clear line between theoretical 
and applied research. The sharing norms of science have broken 
down to the point where they can only be maintained by 
contractually constructed scientific commons that artfully 
manage legal, economic, and technical restrictions on data, 
materials, and information.73 At the same time, the technical 
know-how underlying cumulative and sequential innovation can 
seldom be kept secret for very long. Hence, trade secret protection 
also breaks down, and investors faced with mounting front-end 
costs suffer from a chronic shortage of natural lead time.74 
                                                          
 70. See Reichman, Hybrids, supra note 54, at 252122. 
 71. DAVID C. MOWERY ET AL., IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION 9295 
(2004); So et al., supra note 41, at 207879. 
 72. See, e.g., Paul A. David, Koyaanisqatsi in Cyberspace: The Economics of an Out-
of-Balance Regime of Private Property Rights in Data and Information, in 
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, supra note 2, at 81, 103 (detailing the implications of 
the European Union Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases); J.H. Reichman & 
Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51, 7677 
(1997) (explaining the origins of EUs decision to allow the sui generis protection of 
databases). See generally ESTELLE DERCLAYE, THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF DATABASES: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (2008). 
 73. See, e.g., JOHN WILBANKS & JAMES BOYLE, INTRODUCTION TO SCIENCE COMMONS 5 
(2006), available at http://sciencecommons.org/wp-content/uploads/ScienceCommons_ 
Concept_Paper.pdf (describing the launch of Science Commons, a project designed to ease 
unnecessary legal and technical barriers to sharing, to promote innovation, [and] to provide 
easy, high quality tools that let individuals and organizations specify the terms under which 
they wished to share their material); Peter Lee, Contracting to Preserve Open Science: 
Consideration-Based Regulation in Patent Law, 58 EMORY L.J. 889, 94042 (2009) 
[hereinafter Lee, Contracting to Preserve] (blaming the proliferation of patenting in 
university research for the decrease in sharing of research findings); Reichman & Uhlir, 
supra note 36, at 32921 (advocating a new system of contractually created public access to 
scientific data as the solution to the increasing problem of hoarding); Peter Lee, Toward a 
Distributive Commons in Patent Law 3334 (U.C. Davis Sch. of Law, Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 177, 2009) [hereinafter Lee, Distributive 
Commons] (advocating a commons to solve the problems in technology distribution); JEROME 
H. REICHMAN, TOM DEDEURWAERDERE & PAUL F. UHLIR, DESIGNING THE MICROBIAL 
RESEARCH COMMONS: STRATEGIES FOR ACCESSING, MANAGING AND USING ESSENTIAL 
PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE ASSETS, ch. 2 (Oct. 9, 2009), presented at the International Symposium 
on Designing the Microbial Research Commons, Board on Research Data and Information, 
Policy and Global Affairs Division, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 8
9, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Author).  
 74. Reichman, supra note 53, at 174748; see also Lichtman, supra note 53, at 72728. 
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In response, patents, copyrights, and sui generis laws 
expand in all directions to absorb cumulative and sequential 
innovations that lack other refuges from free-riding 
appropriators and from the risk of market failure.75 This trend, in 
turn, produces mounting thickets of rights that impede both 
technological progress and research, while the risk of endless 
litigation over uncertain legal boundaries leads to daunting 
litigation costs and anticompetitive, defensive patent pools held 
by big, but often slothful, technology distributors.76 
B. Where Developing Country Leadership Could Make a Difference 
The incipient transnational system of innovation emerging 
from the TRIPS Agreement will simply reproduce these same 
unpropitious conditions if the BRIC countries and their allies 
discreetly follow the models embedded in the most developed 
intellectual property systems. What we need instead are new 
models experimentally derived from bold attempts to deal 
directly with these and other unsolved problems. 
I cannot, within the confines of this short Article, explore 
these problems in depth, although more and more academic 
attention is being focused upon them.77 Let me instead put 
forward a partial list of initiatives that the BRIC countries, and 
other emerging economies, working perhaps within the 
framework of a WIPO Development Agenda,78 could consider. The 
list is not meant to be exhaustive, only suggestive, but it does 
give an idea of the kind of initiatives that are needed. 
1. Measures Concerning Patents. In 1997, I suggested that 
developing countries could help to accommodate international 
                                                          
 75. See, e.g., Reichman, Hybrids, supra note 54, at 2525, 253134; Pamela 
Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 233940 (1994) (highlighting the necessity of legal proscription 
against copying in order to encourage innovation in the software industry and cure the 
market failure that unconstrained copying would cause). 
 76. See Shapiro, supra note 24; Eisenberg, supra note 49, at 108788 (exploring the 
burden of inertia regarding intellectual property rights and the resulting distribution of 
responsibility for the removal of access restrictions); see also Birgit Verbeure, Patent 
Pooling for Gene-Based Diagnostic Testing. Conceptual Framework, in GENE PATENTS AND 
COLLABORATIVE LICENSING MODELS, supra note 24, at 3. 
 77. See, e.g., GENE PATENTS AND COLLABORATIVE LICENSING MODELS, supra note 24 
(discussing existing models designed to render patented genetic inventions accessible for 
use in research and exploring further alternatives); supra notes 49, 73; see also EUROPEAN 
PATENT OFFICE, supra note 21. 
 78. See, e.g., Jeremy de Beer, Defining WIPO Development Agenda, in 
IMPLEMENTING THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATIONS DEVELOPMENT 
AGENDA 1, 12, 68 (Jeremy de Beer ed., 2009); Peter Yu, A Tale of Two Development 
Agendas, 35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 465 (2009). 
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minimum standards of patent protection to their national 
development goals by adopting relatively stringent eligibility 
standards covering subject matter, novelty, nonobviousness, and 
disclosure.79 
a. Eligibility Standards in BRIC Countries. The one 
country that has most aggressively pursued this strategy so far is 
India, which particularly seeks to promote its pharmaceutical 
industry. As Professor Kapczynskis research confirms, Indias 
patent law denies subject-matter eligibility to new uses of known 
substances and new forms of known substances that do not 
enhance efficacy. Its stiff nonobviousness standard requires a 
technical advance or economic significance, all with a view to 
discouraging me-too and derivative patents that would 
circumscribe the space in which generic producers could 
operate.80 Although India cannot legally vary eligibility standards 
to suit the needs of different industries,81 its generally high 
standards are reinforced by pre-grant and post-grant opposition 
procedures, and by stringent disclosure requirements,82 which 
other high- and middle-income developing countries would do 
well to consider. 
The level of nonobviousness to be established under the 
recently enacted third revision of the Chinese Patent Law was 
not clear at the time of writing. Article 22 reportedly requires 
prominent substantive features and notable progress (as 
distinct from utility models that require only substantive 
features and progress); but the Patent Examiners Guidelines 
simply invoke the person skilled in the art standard used in 
most OECD countries without further illuminating the drafters 
intent.83  
The new Chinese law definitely adopts a broader, more 
absolute standard of novelty than before,84 and it will allow a 
                                                          
 79. See Reichman, supra note 43, at 2642. 
 80. See The Patents Act, 1970, No. 39, Acts of Parliament, 1970, § 3(d)(f), as 
amended by The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005; 
Kapczynski, supra note 4. 
 81. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 27.1 ([P]atents shall be available and 
patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of 
technology and whether products are imported or locally produced.); Dreyfuss, supra note 
3, at 12 (explaining how Indias system adapted in order to meet the neutrality standard 
in TRIPS, while ensuring that the public will continue to have access to generic drugs). 
 82. See Mueller, supra note 34, at 56774; Kapczynski, supra note 4. 
 83. See, e.g., Gao, supra note 61; E-mail from Jia Hua, Ph.D. Candidate, The 
Pennsylvania State University, to Jerome Reichman, Professor of Law, Duke University 
School of Law (Nov. 17, 2009) (on file with Author). 
 84. See, e.g., Gao, supra note 61 (discussing pending Articles 23 and 24); see also 
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prior art defense to an infringement action that to some extent 
shifts [the] validity issue of a patent from . . . [the examiners] to 
the court.85 The Chinese law will also require disclosure of origin 
for genetic resources, and may invalidate a pending patent if 
laws and regulations pertaining to licit procurement and use of 
such resources have been violated.86 
In general, it seems likely that the problems of low quality 
patents that recently plagued developed countries would become 
more pernicious if allowed to take root in high- and middle-
income developing countries. In particular, low standards of 
nonobviousness would allow powerful foreign companies that 
accumulate patents on incremental innovations to block local 
improvers in developing countries and to maintain patent pools 
that could create formidable barriers to entry.  
Even the United States has recently begun to elevate its 
eligibility standards,87 although not as steeply as those in India. 
Because governments cannot discriminate against foreigners,88 
however, high standards of eligibility must apply equally to local 
inventors. The latter remain free to patent abroad, whatever the 
status of their inventions at home,89 while second tier protection 
may be available to stimulate local investment in small-scale 
innovation.90 
Needless to say, the policy space for evaluating eligibility 
standards against local development needs could shrink 
drastically if such standards were harmonized by TRIPS-plus 
specifications under a Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT).91 
Developing countries should accordingly continue to resist such a 
harmonization exercise. 
                                                          
Wenting Cheng, Third Revision of Patent Law in China (Part I), INTELL. PROP. WATCH, 
Sept. 8, 2009, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2009/09/08/third-revision-of-patent-law-in-
china (discussing Article 22 of the Chinese Patent Law (as amended 2009), which extends 
disclosure of prior use or any other means from domestic (relative) to international 
(absolute)).  
 85. Id.; Gao, supra note 61 (discussing pending art. 63). 
 86. See infra notes 31619 and accompanying text. 
 87. See KSR Intl Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007) ([T]he results of 
ordinary innovation are not the subject of exclusive rights under the patent laws.); In re 
Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 952 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 
129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009). 
 88. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, arts. 2.1, 34; Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property art. 2(1), Mar. 20, 1883, revised July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 
1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention]. 
 89. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 2.1; Paris Convention, supra note 88, art. 
4bis(1). 
 90. See supra notes 5966 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying notes 
15863. 
 91. See Reichman & Dreyfuss, supra note 12, at 98102.  
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b. Problems on the Frontiers of Science. Another reason for 
resisting premature harmonization exercises is that, even in 
developed countries, experts remain uncertain how best to 
resolve problems affecting cutting-edge technologies,92 which 
makes evaluation of the relevant issues even more difficult in 
developing countries. For example, recent studies of the seminal 
genomic discoveries carried out at Duke University, under a 
grant from the National Institutes of Health and the Department 
of Energy, suggest a number of recurring problems on the 
frontiers of science that sometimes pose unresolved problems for 
the patent system as a whole.93 These include: 
− Broad foundational patents that can block research and 
downstream applications and that produce high transaction 
costs for would-be users.94 For example, polymerase chain 
reaction (PCR) and recombinant DNA cloning were covered 
by a few patents, with narrowly averted blocking effects.95 
− An even bigger problem arises when basic research 
platforms are covered by multiple patents held by dispersed 
owners, public and private.96 
− More generally, thickets of overlapping patents may 
cover a research platform or multiple components of an end 
product, especially in interdisciplinary research fields. This 
problem arises, for example, with regard to microarrays, 
synthetic biology (which combines life sciences, computer 
science, and electrical engineering), and now even 
nanotechnology.97 
− With particular regard to information technology, 
hundreds of patents on small contributions may yield patent 
                                                          
 92. See id. at 103. 
 93. Jerome H. Reichman & Jennifer Giordano Coltart, A Holistic Approach to 
Patents Affecting Frontier Sciences: Lessons from the Seminal Genomic Discovery 
Studies, Paper Presented at the CEER Retreat, Duke University Center for Genetics, 
Ethics & Law (Apr. 2008) and at the European Patent Forum: Inventing a Cleaner 
Future: Climate Change and the Opportunities for IP, Ljubljana, Slovenia (May 2008). 
 94. See Eisenberg, supra note 49, at 108485. 
 95. Reichman & Giordano Coltart, supra note 93, at 46 (discussing Cohen-Boyer 
patents), 56 (discussing PCR, which largely emerged from the private sector). 
 96. See Frischmann, supra note 64, at 99597 (asserting that competition among 
downstream users for exclusive licenses favors uses reasonably expected to generate 
appropriate returns, leaving socially valuable research paths . . . fallow and unexplored); 
Lee, Contracting to Preserve, supra note 73, at 903. 
 97. See Sapna Kumar & Arti Rai, Synthetic Biology: The Intellectual Property Puzzle, 
85 TEX. L. REV. 1745, 1747 (2007); Mark A. Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. 
REV. 601, 61822 (2005); Tim Lenoir & Eric Giannella, The Emergence and Diffusion of 
DNA Microarray Technology, J. BIOMEDICAL DISCOVERY & COLLABORATION, Aug. 22, 2006, 
available at http://www.j-biomed-discovery.com/content/pdf/1747-5333-1-11.pdf. 
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thickets with vague boundaries, resulting in holdups and 
excessive litigation.98 A similar, if less dramatic process 
affects private-sector innovators in biotechnology,99 although 
the extent of this problem in that sector remains 
controversial.100 
− Massing of patents for defensive purposes (especially in 
IT) may block entry to competitors and innovators.101 
All these problemsand the resulting transaction costswere 
then worsened by the proliferation of low quality patents, 
especially in the United States. 
These and related problems could inhibit research and keep 
innovators in BRIC countries and other emerging economies from 
realizing their full potential in the biotechnology and information 
industries. They increasingly deter private-sector researchers 
and investors in developed countries from exploring promising 
routes,102 while placing universities in a delicate legal position as 
academics ignore patents when conducting cutting-edge 
research.103 Worse, they could eventually complicate the race for 
innovative climate change technology if future massive 
government funding were to replicate problems now experienced 
in biotech and IT.104 
                                                          
 98. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 23, at 5154 (attributing the poor 
performance of the notice function in the patent system to fuzzy and unpredictable 
patent boundaries, the ease with which patent boundary information can be hidden from 
the public, the disconnect between patent rights and possession of an invention, and the 
failure of systemic safeguards against patent proliferation); Rai, Allison & Sampat, supra 
note 49, at 155154. 
 99. Eisenberg, supra note 49, at 1072; Warcoin, supra note 36, at 33132 
(describing a patent tsunami in diagnostics and related fields). 
 100. Eisenberg, supra note 49, at 108184 (summarizing studies of the experiences 
of research-performing institutions regarding the effects of intellectual property 
restrictions); John P. Walsh, Ashish Arora & Wesley M. Cohen, Effects of Research Tool 
Patents and Licensing on Biomedical Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-
BASED ECONOMY 285, 29293 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003) 
(finding little empirical evidence of constraints on scientific research and considerable 
evidence of widespread infringement by academic scientists who ignore patents); see 
also Christopher M. Holman, The Impact of Human Gene Patents on Innovation and 
Access: A Survey of Human Gene Patent Litigation, 76 UMKC L. REV. 295 (2007) 
(finding little evidence that gene patents adversely impact research and public health 
in contrast to biomedical patents on key pathways and patents on information 
technologies). 
 101. See Shapiro, supra note 24, at 12021; Verbeure, supra note 76, at 47. 
 102. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 49, at 1080; Warcoin, supra note 36, at 33132; 
see also Fiona Murray & Scott Stern, Do Formal Intellectual Property Rights Hinder the 
Free Flow of Scientific Knowledge? An Empirical Test of the Anti-Commons Hypothesis 25, 
27 (Natl Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11465, 2005). 
 103. See, e.g., Walsh et al., supra note 100. 
 104. See Reichman et al., supra note 40, at 78. 
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Generally speaking, the evidence points to the emergence of 
complex frontier sciences that may require integrated 
management in their upstream dimension (and sometimes even 
in the applications domain).105 A holistic approach to intellectual 
infrastructure may then become essential. But the patent system 
operates on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis that is not designed to 
address or govern such complex innovation systems. There 
results a risk of systemic conflict between the holistic needs of 
frontier science (with its own corresponding innovation policy) 
and the methodology of traditional intellectual property laws.106 
i. Some Possible Solutions. In principle, at least five 
primary measures, with varying degrees of nuance, can be 
envisioned to address these challenges. 
− A broad research exemption for the experimental users 
of patented inventions to find new inventions, to invent 
around old ones, or to develop improvements;107 
− An administrative or judicial power to require that the 
invention be made available on a nonexclusive license;108 
− An anti-blocking provision, normally in the form of a 
compulsory license for dependent patents, that allows 
improvers to avoid infringing a dominant patent;109 
− An essential facilities doctrine, familiar from 
competition law theory and practice, that would allow the 
pooling of overlapping patents within a platform 
technology;110 
                                                          
 105. See Frischmann, supra note 96, at 9981003 (advocating a hybrid of various 
possible solutions to revive the information commons); van Overwalle, supra note 24, at 
38590. 
 106. Reichman & Giordano Coltart, supra note 93, at 19. 
 107. See, e.g., Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 64(1), Oct. 5, 1973, 
1065 U.N.T.S. 255, 274; Rudolph J.R. Peritz, Freedom to Experiment: Toward a Concept of 
Inventor Welfare, 90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOCY 245 (2008). 
 108. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 39697 (2006) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring) (explaining that in the current system, injunctions can be used as a 
bargaining chip to charge licensees exorbitant fees). 
 109. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 31(l) (stating the conditions under 
which a compulsory licence for a dependent patent may be granted); GUSTAVO GHIDINI, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND COMPETITION LAW 4445 (2006) (advocating the use of 
compulsory licensing where the subject of an existing patent has been developed through 
an entirely different and more advanced process). 
 110. See Brett Frischmann & Spencer Weber Waller, Revitalizing Essential 
Facilities, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 1021 (2008) (Essential Facilities, Infrastructure, and 
Open Access); Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis & Mark A. Lemley, Anticompetitive 
Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719, 174445 (2003) 
(promoting the idea of cross-licenses that allow parties to use each others technology 
without fear of liability); Allen Kezsbom & Alan V. Goldman, No Shortcut to Antitrust 
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− Compulsory licensing, either for government 
(noncommercial) use or to enable third parties to supply the 
market in the public interest.111 
In practice, the availability of these solutions, and still 
others that have been proposed in developed countries,112 varies 
from country to country and is always somewhat problematic. 
Yet, nothing in the multilateral conventions prevents developing 
countries from implementing these and other related provisions 
in their domestic laws. 
U.S. patent law currently lacks a bona fide research 
exemption, and there is little chance that legislative reform will 
fill this gap. The formal position in the European Union is 
better,113 but actual state practice seems to have narrowed the 
factual availability of this exception. If so, that state of affairs 
would afford an obvious opportunity for counter-
harmonization114 where developing countries could take the lead. 
The Chinese Patent Law, as amended in 2008, codifies a so-
called Bolar exception, which permits generic producers to 
reverse-engineer patented medicines and to conduct clinical 
trials prior to the expiration of the patent.115 A WTO panel upheld 
the legitimacy of this exception under Article 30 of the TRIPS 
                                                          
Analysis: The Twisted Journey of the Essential Facilities Doctrine, 1996 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 1, 12 ([W]hen a monopolist or near-monopolist controlling what is deemed an 
essential facility denies an actual or potential competitor access to that facility, where 
the facility cannot reasonably be duplicated and where there is no valid . . . justification 
for denying access, then the doctrine is applied.). But see Verizon Commcns Inc. v. Law 
Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 41011 (2004) (declining to recognize or 
repudiate the essential facilities doctrine but suggesting that it would not mandate 
complete cooperation between competitors even if recognized). 
 111. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 31; Jerome H. Reichman with 
Catherine Hasenzahl, Non-Voluntary Licensing of Patented Inventions: Historical 
Perspective Under TRIPS, and an Overview of the Practice in Canada and the USA 10, 24 
(Intl Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable Dev., Issue Paper No. 5, 2003), available at 
http://ictsd.org/downloads/2008/06/cs_reichman_hasenzahl.pdf (chronicling the history of 
compulsory licenses and the situations in which such licenses can be used most 
effectively). 
 112. See generally GENE PATENTS AND COLLABORATIVE LICENSING MODELS, supra 
note 24 (exploring proposals and experience with patent pools, clearing houses, open 
source models, and liability regimes). 
 113. See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 136062 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (narrowly 
construing the experimental use defense to patent infringement); Peritz, supra note 107; 
Convention for the European Patent for the Common Market (Community Patent 
Convention), art. 31(b), 1976 O.J. (L 17) 1, 9; Agreement Relating to Community Patents, 
art. 27(b), 1989 O.J. (L 401) 1, 15 (not yet in force). 
 114. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 115. See Feng, supra note 9, at 109 & n.190 (arguing that Article 69(5) of the Chinese 
Patent Law (as amended 2008) helps to balance the relationship between the interests of 
the patentee and the public [ ] and to prevent the abuse of patent rights). 
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Agreement.116 Whether Chinese patent law will maintain a broad 
exception for scientific research generally was not clear at the 
time of writing.117 
There is no anti-blocking provision in U.S. patent law.118 
Hence, if a dominant patentee and an improver bargain to 
impasse, as occurs from time to time, the dominant patentee may 
keep a patented improvement off the market because its sale or 
use would infringe the formers patent.119 While this result may 
suit a dominant patentee because it defends him or her from a 
serious threat of competition, it lessens social welfare by 
depriving the public of the improved product,120 unless the 
government intervenes with a public interest compulsory license. 
Many European countries have accordingly codified 
compulsory licenses for dependent patents,121 which are perfectly 
compatible with the TRIPS Agreement,122 although European 
patent authorities had, until recently, been reluctant to grant 
them in practice. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the 
authorities in Europe may now be more willing to grant such 
licenses and that, even in the past, parties in Italy, Germany, 
and the United Kingdom tended to bargain around the possible 
threat of such an anti-blocking measure, despite the fact that few 
such licenses were actually granted.123 
While China will include a dependent compulsory license in 
its pending patent reform, its availability in other developing 
countries is not widely reported.124 Here, in other words, one finds 
a relatively uncontroversial candidate for actual harmonization 
under TRIPS, rather than counter-harmonization, that 
developing countries should wholeheartedly embrace. 
Even in the absence of a patented improvement as such, the 
complexity of present-day inventions in which numerous 
overlapping patents may be combined makes it advisable that 
                                                          
 116. Panel Report, CanadaPatent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, ¶ 7.45, 
WT/DS114/R (Mar. 17, 2000).  
 117. See, e.g., Feng, supra note 9, at 109 n.190 (noting the existence of an exception 
for the purpose of scientific research and experiment in prior law without further 
comment on its scope). 
 118. See Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: 
The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 8485 (1994). 
 119. GHIDINI, supra note 109, at 3637. 
 120. Id. at 3741. 
 121. See Reichman with Hasenzahl, supra note 111, at 12. 
 122. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 31(l). 
 123. Interviews with Professors Ghidini, Anderman, and Hanns Ullrich.  
 124. See Gao, supra note 61. It seems likely, but not certain, that a compulsory 
license for a dependent patent could be justified under Article 84 of the Indian patent law 
as it exists. See Kapczynski, supra note 4. 
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courts have the power to deny permanent injunctions for 
infringement in the public interest and to allow compensation 
instead, preferably in the form of reasonable royalties. This use 
of a liability rule, rather than a property rule, seems especially 
pertinent when the parties are not in head-to-head competition, 
or when one of them does not actually work the patents it owns, 
as cases following the Supreme Courts eBay decision125 in the 
United States have increasingly recognized.126 Professor 
Kapczynski, among others, rightly commends this approach to 
the developing countries, and she presents evidence that Indian 
case law has already begun to cite eBay with approval.127 
At higher levels of technological development, moreover, the 
advent of platform technologies, often affecting upstream 
research tools, may arise suddenly out of a convergence of 
formerly separate interdisciplinary pursuits. Such a situation 
can present formidable holdout problems that can adversely 
affect both basic research and downstream applications, as 
occurred in the case of microarrays.128 If nothing is done, a 
dominant aggregator may sometimes solve the problem by means 
of vertical integration, while leaving the progress of science in an 
uncertain state and possibly generating serious antitrust 
problems to boot.129  
To solve this problem, when it arises, governments need the 
authority to override existing exclusive licenses and to grant 
nonexclusive licenses to additional or alternative parties in the 
public interest.130 For example, governments must be able to pool or 
bundle platform technologies and to make the platform available as 
a whole to downstream applications when the platform becomes an 
                                                          
 125. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393 (2006) (determining that a 
patent holders lack of commercial activity in working a patent should not automatically 
preclude the granting of a permanent injunction, nor does a finding of infringement 
automatically entitle the holder to such an injunction). 
 126. See, e.g., Christopher Phelps & Assocs. v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532, 543 (4th Cir. 
2007) (applying the eBay holding and rejecting the plaintiffs argument that it is entitled 
to injunctive relief to remedy a copyright infringement). 
 127. Kapczynski, supra note 4; Amy Kapczynski, Innovation Policy for a New Era, 37 
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 264, 26768 (2009). 
 128. See, e.g., Lenoir & Giannella, supra note 97; Kumar & Rai, supra note 97; 
Frischmann, supra note 64. 
 129. See, e.g., Audio tape: Suzanne Scotchmer, A Nonobvious Discussion of Patents, 
held by the 7th Annual Meredith and Kip Frey Lecture in Intellectual Property, Duke 
University Law School (Apr. 3, 2008), available at http://www.law.duke.edu/webcast/ 
podcast/?match=Suzanne+Scotchmer (discussing the dominant aggregatory outcome); 
Frischmann & Weber Waller, supra note 110, at 1028. 
 130. See, e.g., So et al., supra note 41; Peter Lee, The Evolution of Intellectual 
Infrastructure, 83 WASH. L. REV. 39, 10220 (2008); Reichman et al., supra note 40. 
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essential infrastructure for future research and innovation.131 In 
that case, all third parties who use the pooled technology should 
have to pay equitable compensation from their applications to the 
bundle or trust, for distribution to right holders.132 
In principle, competition law can reach a comparable result by 
means of an essential facilities doctrine, which has sometimes 
been used in the European Union,133 but remains in a semi-
moribund state under existing case law in the United States.134 Of 
course, a compulsory license for government use can also be invoked 
to address such a situation without a need to surmount the hurdles 
of competition law, and the United States has invoked government 
use licenses for similar purposes in the past.135 Both India and 
China have enacted comprehensive compulsory licensing schedules 
that appear to clearly encompass such a power.136 
Nevertheless, developing countries with growing 
technological prowess should consider fashioning at least some 
guidelines, if not an actual codification, that would enable the 
authorities to intervene under an established essential facilities 
                                                          
 131. See, e.g., So et al., supra note 41, at 2081; Verbeure, supra note 76, at 1620 
(case studies), 2129 (application to diagnostic testing); Frischmann, supra note 64; 
Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 839, 89091 (1990) (demonstrating that a government-imposed patent 
pool enabled the manufacture of airplanes for use in World War I). 
 132. See, e.g., REICHMAN, DEDEURWAERDERE & UHLIR, supra note 73, ch. 2 
(proposing pooled semicommons for upstream microbial research materials, with liability 
rules for downstream applications); see also Lee, supra note 130, at 11216 (showing the 
critical role of liability rules in preserving access to intellectual infrastructure); Arti K. 
Rai, Jerome H. Reichman, Paul F. Uhlir & Colin Crossman, Pathways Across the Valley of 
Death: Novel Intellectual Property Strategies for Accelerated Drug Discovery, 8 YALE J. 
HEALTH POLY L. & ETHICS 1, 2030 (2008) (proposing the pooling of pre-competitive small 
molecule libraries, with liability rule option); Reichman et al., supra note 40, at 2833 
(identifying technical tools under the TRIPS Agreement for breaking obstacles to transfer 
of green technologies). See generally Reichman, supra note 53, at 177677 (proposing a 
compensatory liability regime in place of a model that favors hybrid exclusive rights).  
 133. See, e.g., Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Commn, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601; 
Emanuela Arezzo, Intellectual Property Rights at the Crossroad Between Monopolization 
and Abuse of Dominant Position: American and European Approaches Compared, 24 J. 
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 455, 48687 (2006) (noting that the European Court of 
Justice has never formally recognized the essential facilities doctrine); Rita Coco, 
Antitrust Liability for Refusal to License Intellectual Property: A Comparative Analysis 
and the International Setting, 12 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 1417 (2008) (discussing 
the evolution of the exceptional circumstances doctrine as applied by the European 
Court of Justice to create an essential facilities paradigm). 
 134. Verizon Commcns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 
41011 (2004) (declining to recognize or repudiate the essential facilities doctrine). But 
see Frischmann & Weber Waller, supra note 110 (making the case for revitalizing this 
doctrine to promote access to intellectual infrastructure). 
 135. Reichman with Hasenzahl, supra note 111, at 5. 
 136. See, e.g., Feng, supra note 9, at 2931; Kapczynski, supra note 4; Gao, supra 
note 61. 
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doctrine in order to rescue a platform technology when 
circumstances so require.137 Such intervention becomes 
particularly necessary when holdouts elevate the prices charged 
for use of the platform to the point where both research and 
applications risk becoming casualties of deadweight loss. 
Notice that, with regard to compulsory licenses for 
government use, which are widely invoked in the United States 
for multiple purposes, and not just national security, the TRIPS 
Agreement limits exports to 49.9% of production.138 So it became 
necessary to amend TRIPS to allow back-to-back compulsory 
licenses, thus enabling countries with capacity to manufacture 
medicines to supply poor countries that needed access to generic 
drugs but lacked manufacturing capacity under compulsory 
licenses of their own.139 Both China and India have adopted 
legislation enabling them to supply generic versions of patented 
medicines to other countries under this scheme.140 
There is a larger principle here of considerable importance. 
For example, developing countries may need to assist each other 
with access to essential climate change technologies, and pooled 
procurement strategies may become advisable.141 So this concept of 
back-to-back compulsory licenses for inputs of essential technology 
may need to be broadened, and NGOs concerned about access to 
green technologies have already commissioned studies of this 
topic.142 
                                                          
 137. Frischmann & Weber Waller, supra note 110, at 1728. 
 138. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 31(f) ([A]ny such use shall be authorized 
predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the Member authorizing such 
use. (emphasis added)); Reichman with Hasenzahl, supra note 111, at 5. 
 139. See Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 31, ¶ 6 (WTO Members with 
insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face 
difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement.); 
World Trade Organization, General Council Decision of 30 August 2003, Implementation 
of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 
¶ 2, WT/L/540 (Sept. 2, 2003); World Trade Organization, General Council Decision of 6 
December 2005, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, Annex, WT/L/641 (Dec. 8, 2005) 
(pending ratification by Members); Abbott & Reichman, supra note 38, at 942 
(explaining the requirements for granting compulsory licenses to exporting members 
under paragraph 6 of the Doha Public Health Declaration). 
 140. See Abbott & Reichman, supra note 38, at 969; Feng, supra note 9, at 10001 
(discussing Article 50 of the Chinese Patent Law (as amended 2008)). See generally 
Jerome H. Reichman, Compulsory Licensing of Patented Pharmaceutical Inventions: 
Evaluating the Options, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 247 (2009) (tracing the relevant legislative 
history pertaining to compulsory licensing of patented pharmaceuticals and the effect of 
the waiver to, and amendment of, Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement). 
 141. Abbott & Reichman, supra note 38, at 97379 (advocating pooled procurement 
strategies when seeking essential medicines under compulsory licenses enabled by the 
waiver to TRIPS art. 31(f)). 
 142. See Abbott, supra note 40, at 26; Reichman et al., supra note 40, at 2528 
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ii. Checks and Balances in the Public Funding of Research. 
The developing countries that are more technologically advanced 
should also formulate their own approach to regulating the 
patenting of government-funded research results, particularly 
those obtained by universities and other public research centers. 
Although the benefits of the Bayh-Dole Act143 are well advertised, 
the unresolved problems it creates are also increasingly well 
documented, as are a growing list of needed reforms, which will 
be hard to enact in the United States.144 
Recently, seven American experts published a detailed list of 
concerns about the effects of the Bayh-Dole Act in the United 
States,145 and they recommended a number of minimum 
safeguards in the public interest.146 Perhaps the most 
fundamental recommendation was that publicly funded 
university research results should not be exclusively licensed, 
unless such a license becomes essential for commercialization.147 
Because many research tools can be used off the shelf without 
further downstream R&D, as was the case with the Cohen-Boyer 
patents in DNA sequencing,148 an exclusive license is often 
unnecessary and counterproductive. 
Other recommendations these authors put forward are as 
follows: 
− The governing legislation should ensure transparency 
in the patenting and licensing of publicly funded research 
results.149 
− Where initial licensing arrangements for publicly 
funded research do not achieve public interest objectives, 
                                                          
(suggesting cooperative methods for transfer of clean technology from developed countries 
to developing countries). 
 143. 35 U.S.C. §§ 20012 (2006 & Supp. 2009). 
 144. Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 31011 (recommending reforms to the 
Bayh-Dole Act that would allow more latitude for funding agencies and would 
maximize the social value of federally funded inventions and discoveries); So et al., 
supra note 41, at 207980 (analyzing recent studies showing that the Bayh-Dole Act 
has not significantly increased revenues earned by academic institutions from patent 
licensing and noting the tax-like effect that the law has on institutions with licenses on 
the resulting patents). 
 145. So et al., supra note 41, at 2078. Besides Anthony So, the authors included 
Bhaven Sampat, Arti K. Rai, Robert Cook-Deegan, Jerome H. Reichman, Robert 
Weissman, and Amy Kapczynski. 
 146. Id. at 2081. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 2079 (demonstrating that nonexclusive licensing did not deter the 
commercialization of the Cohen-Boyer patents for recombinant DNA, which produced 
$255 million in licensing revenues while reportedly contributing to 2,442 new products 
and $35 billion in sales). 
 149. Id. at 2081. 
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governmental authorities must have power to override such 
licenses and to grant licenses to additional or alternative 
parties.150 
− The government should retain an automatic right to 
use any invention arising from its funding.151 
− Besides promoting commercialization of upstream 
research results, the government must ensure consumer 
access to end products on reasonable terms and 
conditions.152 
− Governments should not presume that either patenting 
or exclusive licenses are necessarily the best options, but 
may instead focus on placing by default or by strategy 
government-funded inventions into the public domain, 
creating a scientific commons, enabling collective 
management of intellectual property, or fostering open-
source innovation.153 
− Where greater commercial incentives seem 
necessary, the benefits of nonexclusive licensing should 
always be weighed against the social cost of exclusive 
licenses.154 
In other words, instead of simply imitating the U.S. model as 
it stands, the developing countries should try to formulate 
improved versions of the Bayh-Dole principle. Such efforts would 
better address both the need to ensure access to research tools for 
the research community and the question of abusive pricing of 
end products, given the extent to which relevant R&D costs were 
borne by taxpayers in the first instance. In this connection, 
developing countries need to devise their own publicprivate 
initiatives to endow venture capital funds (and perhaps related 
research prize contests155) that might emulate or improve upon 
                                                          
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 2082; see also BOYLE, supra note 23 (chapter on Science Commons); Janet 
Hope, Open Source Genetics. Conceptual Framework, in GENE PATENTS AND 
COLLABORATIVE LICENSING MODELS, supra note 24, at 171; Esther van Zimmerman, 
Clearinghouse Mechanisms in Genetic Diagnostics, in GENE PATENTS AND COLLABORATIVE 
LICENSING MODELS, supra note 24, at 63. 
 154. So et al., supra note 41, at 2078. 
 155. See, e.g., JAMES LOVE & TIM HUBBARD, THE BIG IDEA: PRIZES TO STIMULATE 
R&D FOR NEW MEDICINES 9 (2007), available at http://www.keionline.org/misc-docs/ 
bigidea-prizes.pdf (discussing the development of a prize system as an alternative to 
exclusive marketing rights); Audio tape: Thomas Pogge, The AstraZeneca Lecture of 2008, 
held by the Federation of European Pharmacological Societies (July 1317, 2008), 
available at http://www.ephar2008.org/downloads/TPoggePublicEthicsRadioLatest.pdf. 
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the successful models currently deployed in some OECD 
countries.  
Unfortunately, Indias hurried enactment of a Bayh-Dole-
like statute without due regard to these proposed safeguards 
does not bode well for the future.156 Similar statutes are under 
consideration in numerous other countries, including South 
Africa,157 and it remains to be seen whether greater caution will 
be exercised there than was the case in India. 
iii. Smarter Use of Second Tier Regimes. While the 
emerging economies as a whole should maintain relatively pro-
competitive markets for innovation vis-à-vis the high-
protectionist regimes in the United States and the European 
Union, this strategy does not require developing countries to 
sacrifice their own domestic innovators to free-riding 
appropriators. Rather, these countries need to outsmart the high-
protectionists by fashioning intellectual property regimes that 
match their own needs and capacities without violating 
international IP norms.158  
In particular, they could take the lead in making sensible 
uses of liability rules to stimulate rapid exchanges of cumulative 
and sequential innovation, especially for purposes of follow-on 
innovation,159 while reserving strong exclusive rights for a 
relatively restricted class of truly nonobvious inventions. Chinas 
second amendment to its Patent Law in 2000 may have taken a 
step in that direction by allowing a compulsory license when 
utility model owners refuse to deal on reasonable terms or 
conditions.160 
                                                          
 156. The Protection and Utilisation of Public Funded Intellectual Property Bill, 2008, 
Bill No. LXVI of 2008 (India); see also Sampat, supra note 41; Rahul Vartak & Manish 
Saurastri, The Indian Version of the Bayh-Dole Act, INTELL. ASSET MGMT., Mar./Apr. 
2009, at 6264 (noting concerns that the Indian law was hastily drafted without public 
debate and fails to protect the public interest but insisting that the bill is a step in the 
right direction). 
 157. So et al., supra note 41, at 2078. 
 158. See Reichman, supra note 53, at 175456 (advocating a liability rule for small-
scale innovation to avoid the social costs of hybrid regimes of exclusive property rights); 
see also Lichtman, supra note 53.  
 159. Jerome H. Reichman & Tracy Lewis, Using Liability Rules to Stimulate Local 
Innovation in Developing Countries: Application to Traditional Knowledge, in 
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, supra note 2, at 337, 35658 (proposing a 
compensatory liability regime to advance the interests of developing countries without 
impeding follow-on innovation or creating barriers to entry). 
 160. See Feng, supra note 9, at 30 (citing Articles 48 and 51 of the Chinese Patent 
Law 2000). Actual use of this provision was not known at the time of writing. 
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As previously discussed, there are several ways developing 
countries could achieve this different kind of balance: by enacting 
and implementing compulsory licenses for dependent 
improvements;161 by limiting injunctions to cases that 
demonstrably serve the public interest, now once again a 
characteristic of U.S. law and practice;162 or by codifying an ex 
ante regime of compensatory liability rules that I have elsewhere 
described, which might particularly benefit commercial 
exploitation of traditional knowledge and related resources.163 
iv. Incentives for Promoting Public Health, the 
Environment, and Collaborative Research. Developing countries 
should take the lead in revamping increasingly obsolete 
approaches to the use of IPRs in the field of medicine. In no other 
area is there a greater need for innovative approaches, with an 
ever-lengthening list of potential tools that could be used to 
increase research outputs and to achieve better distributional 
outcomes as well. These include: 
− Proposals for pre-competitive pooling of privately 
owned small molecule libraries, with a view to facilitating 
the upstream identification of promising target molecules 
through university-generated assay designs;164 
− Proposals for publicprivate technology pools that 
would undo patent thickets and stimulate investment, while 
preserving revenues from downstream applications for single 
depositors;165 
− Proposals for government funding of clinical trial 
studies, with corresponding buy-ins at the international level 
and release of results to the worldwide scientific 
community;166 
                                                          
 161. See supra notes 12122 and accompanying text. 
 162. See supra notes 12526 and accompanying text; Kapczynski, supra note 4 
(discussing F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd., (2008) 642 I.A., in which the Indian 
tribunal referenced the U.S. Supreme Courts eBay decision when denying an injunction 
to promote access to medicine). 
 163. See supra notes 59, 159 and accompanying text. 
 164. See Rai et al., supra note 132, at 2122. 
 165. See Roy Widdus, Product Development Partnerships on Neglected Diseases: 
Intellectual Property and Improving Access to Pharmaceuticals for HIV/AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
ACCESS TO MEDICINES 205, 21114 (Pedro Roffe et al. eds., 2006); see also Carmen E. 
Correa, The SARS case. IP Fragmentation and Patent Pools, in GENE PATENTS AND 
COLLABORATIVE LICENSING MODELS, supra note 24, at 42; Verbeure, supra note 76 
(diagnostic testing). 
 166. See Jerome H. Reichman, Rethinking the Role of Clinical Trial Data in 
International Intellectual Property Law: The Case for a Public Goods Approach, 13 MARQ. 
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− Proposals for buy-outs and humanitarian licensing,167 
as well as for pooled procurement strategies under the 
amended TRIPS provisions, with a view to encouraging the 
distribution of essential medicines on a high-volume, low-
margin marketing strategy;168 and 
− Proposals for prizes and other novel research 
inducements that would help to separate the research and 
marketing functions in the medical sector.169 
Were the leading developing countries to pursue their own 
proactive policies in this area, precisely at a time when their 
medical research capacity keeps growing, it could lead to novel 
and perhaps breakthrough solutions of benefit to the rest of the 
world. 
Less innovative, but still worth considering, is the possibility 
under Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement170 for any country to 
adopt a regime of international exhaustion, with a view to 
permitting parallel imports of patented products from any place 
where the product in question was put on the market with the 
patentees authorization. Chinas third amendment of its Patent 
Law in 2008 has reportedly instituted just such a regime, with an 
eye to obtaining patented medicine which China has difficulty in 
manufacturing or otherwise obtaining.171 Parallel imports may 
also help some developing countries obtain green technologies 
at more affordable prices, although this process can also exert 
upward pressures on the prices generally charged in developing 
countries, in order to avoid arbitrage through parallel imports.172 
Green technologies are, of course, another area where 
developing countries could supply much needed leadership. Here 
                                                          
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 5253 (2009); Tracy R. Lewis, Jerome H. Reichman & Anthony 
D. So, The Case for Public Funding and Public Oversight of Clinical Trials, ECONOMISTS 
VOICE, Jan. 2007, at 1, 12, http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol4/iss1/art3. 
 167. See Amy Kapczynski et al., Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open 
Licensing Approach for University Innovations, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031, 1109 (2005) 
(detailing a neglected disease exemption to advance access to biomedical technology in 
low- to middle-income countries); James Love, Four Practical Measures to Enhance Access 
to Medical Technologies, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS 
TO MEDICINES, supra note 165, at 241, 243 (showing that the flexibilities in the TRIPS 
Agreement allow for humanitarian licensing to address public health crises); Kevin 
Outterson, Patent Buy-Outs for Global Disease Innovations for Low and Middle-Income 
Countries, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 159, 171 (2006). 
 168. Abbott & Reichman, supra note 38, at 97383. 
 169. LOVE & HUBBARD, supra note 155, at 24. 
 170. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 6. 
 171. Feng, supra note 9, at 10406 (assessing the impact of parallel import as 
authorized by Article 69 of the Chinese Patent Law (as amended 2008)). 
 172. See Reichman et al., supra note 40, at 3337. 
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some recent studies suggest that IPRs have so far been playing 
an appropriately stimulatory role.173 The problems elsewhere 
observed in regard to information technology and biotechnology 
have not yet seriously appeared in this sector, perhaps because it 
remains at an incipient stage, with many small players and with 
relatively few large-scale capital investments.174 Precisely 
because emerging economies could participate on the ground 
floor of future developments in environmental technologies, it 
behooves their governments to devise collaborative strategies to 
foster maximum growth and participation, without the 
impediments that excessive protection has caused in other 
sectors.175 
Moreover, there is growing interest in new strategies to 
develop the so-called sharing economy, which has produced such 
successes as the open-source operating system and Wikipedia.176 
Considerable efforts are also underway to devise new forms of 
scientific cooperation that could cut through legal, technical, and 
economic barriers to the Mertonian sharing ethos, that could help 
to establish worldwide scientific networks and commons on an 
unprecedented scale, and that might extend open source 
methodologies to new fields of study.177 Here, again, developing 
                                                          
 173. See JOHN H. BARTON, MITIGATING CLIMATE CHANGE THROUGH TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFER: ADDRESSING THE NEEDS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 910 (2008), available at 
http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/12357_1008barton.pdf; John H. Barton, Intellectual 
Property and Access to Clean Energy Technologies in Developing Countries 18 (Intl Ctr. for 
Trade & Sustainable Dev., Issue Paper No. 2, 2007), available at http://www.iprsonline.org/ 
New%202009/CC%20Barton.pdf. 
 174. See Maskus & Okediji, supra note 40, at 23; Reichman et al., supra note 40, at 
78. 
 175. See CHATHAM HOUSE, CHANGING CLIMATES: INTERDEPENDENCIES ON ENERGY 
AND CLIMATE SECURITY FOR CHINA AND EUROPE 61 (2007), available at 
http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/research/eedp/papers/view/-/id/580 (discussing the 
bilateral establishment of standards to encourage trade and investment between China 
and the European Union); INTL CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV., GENEVA ANNUAL 
CHINA DIALOGUE: CHINA, TRADE AND CLIMATE CHANGE 7 (2008), available at 
http://ictsd.net/downloads/2009/03/geneva-annual-china-dialogue-on-trade-and-cliamte-
change-meeting-report1.pdf (summarizing different approaches to promote research on 
climate change in developing countries). 
 176. See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 7071 (2006) (examining 
the development of Wikipedia); BOYLE, supra note 23, at 19798. 
 177. REICHMAN, DEDEURWAERDERE & UHLIR, supra note 73, chs. 2, 5 (proposing a 
digitally integrated microbial research commons covering materials, literature, and data). 
See generally Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 36 (proposing contractually reconstructed 
research commons for scientific data); Jonathan M. Barnett, Sharing in the Shadow of 
Property: Rational Cooperation in Innovation Markets 5768 (Univ. S. Cal. Ctr. in Law, 
Econ. & Org., Research Paper No. C08-22, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1287283 (discussing the evolution of open source software in the United States); 
Lee, Distributive Commons, supra note 73, at 91819 (demonstrating that open source 
methods provide a model for the contractual creation of a biomedical science research 
commons); Michael J. Madison, Brett M. Frischmann & Katherine J. Strandburg, 
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countries should participate actively in these initiatives178 and 
not sit on the sidelines waiting for others to succeed. 
2. Measures Concerning Copyrights and Neighboring 
Rights. Another task badly in need of innovative solutions is the 
quest for sensible exceptions to, and limitations on, the exclusive 
rights of domestic copyright laws that are otherwise governed by 
the TRIPS Agreement and the under-theorized three-step test 
it incorporated from the Berne Convention.179 Here, major efforts 
are under way in both academic and government circles to 
rethink the question of exceptions and limitations from a more 
public interest perspective than was possible in the immediate 
aftermath of TRIPS.180 
                                                          
Constructing Commons in the Cultural Environment (Univ. of Pittsburgh Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2008-26, 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1265793 (proposing a research framework for the analysis of 
constructed cultural commons in the context of intellectual property). 
 178. See, e.g., Mizukami & Lemos, supra note 33, at 4647 (analyzing Brazils 
tecnobrega industry to show that innovation can thrive without a system of intellectual 
property enforcement); Alessandro Octaviani, Biotechnology in Brazil: Promoting Open 
Innovation, in ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN BRAZIL, supra note 33, at 127, 13436 
(discussing the Genoma Program in Brazil to show that a decentralized network approach 
to biotechnology can be successful in a developing country); Minna Allarakhia, Open 
Source Biopharmaceutical InnovationA Mode of Entry for Firms in Emerging Markets, 6 
J. BUS. CHEMISTRY 11, 11 (2009). 
 179. See, e.g., TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 13 (Members shall confine 
limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not conflict 
with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the right holder.); Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works art. 9(2), Sept. 9, 1886, as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971, and amended 
on Sept. 28, 1979, S. TREATY DOC. No. 99-27 (1986) (It shall be a matter for legislation in 
the countries of the Union to permit the reproduction of such works in certain special 
cases, provided that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the 
work and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.). 
 180. See, e.g., P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ & RUTH L. OKEDIJI, OPEN SOCY INST., 
CONCEIVING AN INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENT ON LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS TO 
COPYRIGHT 19 (2008) (emphasizing the need to ensure that copyright laws are effectively 
harnessed for the public good); Christophe Geiger et al., Max Planck Institute for Intell. 
Prop., Competition & Tax Law, Declaration on a Balanced Interpretation of the Three-
Step Test in Copyright Law, 39 INTL REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 707 (2008) 
[hereinafter Three-Step Test] (emphasizing the need to consider not only the interests of 
right holders, but also the public); Marianne Levin, Intellectual Property Rights in 
Transition: Legal Structures and Concepts in Adaptation to Technological Challenges 
Towards an Intellectual Property System for the 21st Century, 42 SCANDINAVIAN STUD. L. 
83, 88 (2002) (highlighting the importance of safeguarding investments with public 
interests); Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Time for a Paradigm Shift? Exploring Maximum 
Standards in International Intellectual Property Protection, 1 TRADE L. & DEV. 56 (2009); 
see also WIPO, Proposal for the Establishment of a Development Agenda for WIPO, Annex, 
WIPO Doc. PCDA/1/5 (Feb. 17, 2006) (noting developing countries proposal for the 
adoption of a Treaty on Access to Knowledge); infra note 195 and accompanying text (CEC 
Green Paper (2008)). See also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS-Round II: Should Users 
Strike Back?, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 21, 2227 (2004) (suggesting ways to combat the one-
way ratchet of intellectual property protection without regard to the public interest); 
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Much has been written lately about the excesses of recent 
copyright legislation in general, and the concomitant expansion 
of related rights, including database protection laws, which 
increasingly complicate and obstruct the very creativity and 
innovation that intellectual property rights were originally 
designed to promote.181 Nowhere are these tensions so acute182 or 
so likely to generate disproportionately large social costs as in 
the field of basic scientific research.183 In particular, abundant 
evidence now shows that science-hostile intellectual property 
laws, in combination with the science publishers restrictive 
licensing practices, collide head-on with core advances in 
digitally integrated scientific research methods.184 
                                                          
Jerome H. Reichman, Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Pamela Samuelson, A Reverse Notice and 
Takedown Regime to Enable Public Interest Uses of Technically Protected Copyrighted 
Work, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 981, 98485 (2007); Knowledge Economy Intl, Proposal for 
Treaty on Access to Knowledge art. 3-1, http://www.cptech.org/a2k/a2k_treaty_may9.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 30, 2009) (stressing the need for limitations to copyrights when the 
public use value outweighs the cost to the copyright holder). 
 181. See generally BENKLER, supra note 176, at 47071 (discussing the difficulty that 
will be involved in passing the needed reforms); BOYLE, supra note 23, at 26; DAVID L. 
LANGE & H. JEFFERSON POWELL, NO LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE IMAGE OF AN 
ABSOLUTE FIRST AMENDMENT 157 (2008) (discussing the failure of copyright law to protect 
freedom of expression and freedom of the press); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: THE 
NATURE AND FUTURE OF CREATIVITY 18894 (2005) (providing specific examples of the 
barriers to innovation resulting from current copyright law); James Boyle, The Second 
Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 33, 4344; Paul Edward Geller, Beyond the Copyright 
Crisis: Principles For Change, 55 J. COPYRIGHT SOCY U.S.A. 165, 168 (2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1114372 (The growth of copyright law has inexorably impinged 
on basic interests in freedom of expression and privacy.).  
 182. See, e.g., Reto Hilty, Copyright Law and Scientific Research, in COPYRIGHT LAW: 
A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 315, 318 (Paul Torremans ed., 2007) 
[hereinafter Hilty, Copyright Law and Scientific Research] ([Scientists] have suddenly 
become aware that copyright is not only capable of providing them with protection for 
their achievements, but also that under certain circumstances it can become an 
obstacle . . . .); Reto M. Hilty, Five Lessons About Copyright in the Information Society: 
Reaction of the Scientific Community to Over-Protection and What Policy Makers Should 
Learn, 53 J. COPYRIGHT SOCY U.S.A. 103, 11618 (2006) [hereinafter Hilty, Five Lessons]; 
Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 36, at 396415 (evaluating social costs of a disintegrating 
scientific research commons); Pamela Samuelson, Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to 
Science, 293 SCIENCE 2028, 2028 (2001) (Recent legislation in the United States and 
Europe whose ostensible purpose is to protect copyrighted works from pirates is being 
used to inhibit science and stifle academic research . . . .). 
 183. See, e.g., Paul David, The Economic Logic of Open Science and the Balance 
Between Private Property Rights and the Public Domain in Scientific Data and 
Information: A Primer, in THE ROLE OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DATA AND 
INFORMATION IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 19, 27 (Julie M. Esanu & Paul F. Uhlir eds., 2003) 
(discussing how the proliferation of intellectual property rights is inhibiting access to 
information in several areas, including basic research); Maskus & Reichman, supra 
note 2, at 1617 (discussing the difficulty of ensuring that the social benefits of current 
innovation are not outweighed by the social costs of deterring future innovation). 
 184. See generally REICHMAN, DEDEURWAERDERE & UHLIR, supra note 73, ch. 3; 
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a. Privatizing the Scientific Research Commons. On one 
hand, new information technologies and related scientific tools, 
especially bioinformatics, are transforming traditional scientific 
fields, such as molecular biology,185 and are spawning new fields 
such as genomics and proteonomics, with unlimited scientific 
opportunities in the digital environment.186 
The worldwide scientific community needs to develop and 
expand these digital opportunities, especially at public research 
institutes and universities, while maintaining the classical 
functions of certification and diffusion of research results 
inherited from the pre-digital print epoch.187 
On the other hand, the digital revolution that created such 
promising opportunities for scientific research also generated 
intense fears that hardcopy publishers would become vulnerable 
to massive infringements online and to other threats of market 
failure.188 In response, publishers pushed legislatures to recast 
and restructure copyright law in the online environment so as to 
preserve business models built around the print media.189 As 
Professor Okediji and I have noted before:  
In so doing, [publishers] managed to curb pre-existing 
limitations and exceptions (L&Es) in the online 
environment, including those favorable to science; to embed 
pay-per-use machinery into electronic fences surrounding 
online transmissions even of scientific articles; and, 
particularly in the EU and increasingly elsewhere, to add 
new sui generis data protection disciplines that restrict 
                                                          
Reichman & Okediji, supra note 23, at 78 (discussing the problem of data protection 
disciplines that restrict access to the very facts, data, and information that are the 
lifeblood of basic scientific research). 
 185. REICHMAN, DEDEURWAERDERE & UHLIR, supra note 73, ch. 3. 
 186. [T]he use of computational methodologies within the life sciences, such as 
bioinformatics, in the building of global collections of articles and data in 
microbiology, and in the integration of relevant research results makes it 
possible to build accumulative, field specific knowledge repositories that capture 
reams of relevant scientific and technical information and data about micro-
organisms . . . . [S]toring, curating, maintaining and making this huge 
accumulation of genomic data of interest to microbiology presents unique 
problems as well as unique opportunities. Once available, there is a pressing 
need to develop general data-mining tools for automated knowledge discovery in 
the chosen environment and to establish dynamically updated and flexible 
portals for disseminating research results. 
Id. at 61 (citations omitted). 
 187. See id. at 6163. 
 188. Reichman & Okediji, supra note 23, at 8. 
 189. See Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. INTL L. 369, 
40506 (1997); see also Geller, supra note 181, at 166 (Copyright law is in crisis. . . . [I]t has 
become more and more complicated and less and less reliable, while losing legitimacy.). 
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access to the very facts, data, and information that are the 
lifeblood of basic scientific research.190 
As a result, thickets of rights, backed by Technological Protection 
Measures (TPMs) and Digital Rights Management (DRM) 
restrictions in the online environment, impede effective 
exploitation of automated knowledge discovery tools by blocking 
integrated access to scientific information and data scattered 
over a broad range of articles and databases that may or may not 
be available online.191  
Scientists need, and traditionally depend on, a robust public 
domain, in which existing information and data become inputs to 
future knowledge assets that cannot be generated without them. 
Instead, successful special interest lobbying at both the 
national192 and international levels193 has overprotected existing 
knowledge goods at the expense of the public domain, while 
compromising digitally empowered scientific research 
opportunities with little regard for the social costs and burdens 
imposed on future creation and innovation. 
High-level officials at the European Commission have 
publicly recognized the dangers to public science in this 
situation.194 In 2008, the Commission itself issued a Green Paper, 
                                                          
 190. Reichman & Okediji, supra note 23, at 8; see J.H. Reichman & Pamela 
Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51, 95 (1997); see also 
DERCLAYE, supra note 72. 
 191. See, e.g., NANCY L. MARON & K. KIRBY SMITH, CURRENT MODELS OF DIGITAL 
SCHOLARLY COMMUNICATION 31 (2008), available at http://www.arl.org/bm~doc/current-
models-report.pdf; Hilty, Copyright Law and Scientific Research, supra note 182, at 315; 
Paul A. David, New Moves in Legal Jujitsu to Combat the Anti-commons: Mitigating IPR 
Constraints on Innovation thru a Bottom-up Approach to Systemic Institutional Reform 
(Dynamics of Insts. & Mkts. in Europe, Working Paper No. 81, 2008), available at 
http://www.dime-eu.org/files/active/0/WP81-IPR.pdf. 
 192. See, e.g., Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 
(1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.); Council Directive 
2001/29/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 4, 9 (EC); Council Directive 96/9/EC, 1996 O.J. (L 77) (EC); 
see also Hilty, Five Lessons, supra note 182, at 112 (attributing the passage of the DMCA 
to sustained pressure from the entertainment industrys powerful lobbying efforts). 
 193. See, e.g., WIPO Copyright Treaty, adopted Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 
105-17 (1997) [hereinafter WCT] (an international treaty enacted in 1996 concerning 
digital copyright issues); WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, adopted Dec. 20, 
1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17 (1997) (international treaty enacted in 1996 governing 
so-called neighboring rights of performers and producers of sound recordings). Very 
restrictive domestic implementation of these treaties is then re-exported to developing 
countries by means of bilateral or regional Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). See, e.g., 
Bryan Mercurio, TRIPS-Plus Provisions in FTAs: Recent Trends, in REGIONAL TRADE 
AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 215, 21719 (Lorand Bartels & Federico 
Ortino eds., 2006) (describing the process of enacting international agreements governing 
copyright issues). 
 194. See, e.g., Tilman Lüder, Copyright Expansion: Can We Have Too Much?, 
Remarks at the Second Global Forum on Intellectual Property, Singapore Academy of 
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seeking to foster a debate about how to better promote the free 
movement of knowledge and innovation in the European Unions 
single market, with particular regard to the dissemination of 
research, science, and educational materials.195 
Notwithstanding these initiatives, entrenched publishing 
interests in the European Union and the OECD countries 
generally have so far blocked any realistic prospects for top-down 
legislative reforms, despite mounting worldwide pressures for 
greater access to knowledge.196 This resistance has prodded the 
scientific community to make greater efforts to manage its own 
essential knowledge inputs by means that attempt to neutralize 
the impediments to upstream research that intellectual property 
rights increasingly spawn.197 Some of these initiatives, 
particularly those spun off from the Creative Commons and 
Science Commons movements, have spread to developing 
countries, with notable success, for example, in Brazil.198 
                                                          
Intellectual Property Law (Jan. 89, 2009); Tilman Lüder, Remarks at the Workshop on 
Creation and Innovation, Seventeenth Annual Fordham Intellectual Property Law 
Institute Conference, Cambridge, United Kingdom (Apr. 1516, 2009); Commission First 
Evaluation of Directive 96/9/EC on the Legal Protection of Databases 2324 (Dec. 12, 
2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/databases/ 
evaluation_report_en.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2009) (discussing the danger of sui generis 
protection inhibiting innovation and growth). 
 195. Commission Green Paper on Copyright in the Knowledge Economy, at 3, COM 
(2008) 466/3, available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/copyright-
infso/greenpaper_en.pdf. 
 196. Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of 
Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804 (2008); Amy Kapczynski, Linking Ideas to 
Outcomes: A Response, YALE L.J. POCKET PART 289, 28990 (2008); James Love, Risks 
and Opportunities for Access to Knowledge, in VISION OR HALLUCINATION? 187, 189 
(Soledad Bervejillo ed., 2005). 
 197. See MINNA ALLARAKHIA, D. MARC KILGOUR & J.D. FULLER, GAME MODELS OF 
THE DEFECTION DILEMMA IN BIOPHARMACEUTICAL DISCOVERY RESEARCH 7 (2008), 
http://orion.uwaterloo.ca/~hwolkowi/henry/reports/mitacs.d/pdf/David/pub1.pdf (Fully 
disclosing knowledge facilitates future collaboration while appropriating knowledge 
strengthens a researchers bargaining position for trade in knowledge.); Peter Lee, 
Contracting to Preserve Open Science: Consideration-Based Regulation in Patent Law, 58 
EMORY L.J. 889, 96374 (2009); Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 36, at 41660 (A 
Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons for Science and Innovation); see also 
Creative Commons, http://creativecommons.org (last visited Nov. 16, 2009) (providing free 
copyright licenses to various works and allowing the creator to choose among several 
levels of access); Science Commons, http://sciencecommons.org (last visited Nov. 16, 2009) 
(providing a similar service for scientific works aimed at [i]dentifying and lowering 
unnecessary barriers to research); WILBANKS & BOYLE, supra note 73, at 5 (describing 
Science Commons as a project designed to ease unnecessary legal and technical barriers to 
sharing, to promote innovation, [and] to provide easy, high quality tools that let individuals 
and organizations specify the terms under which they wished to share their material). 
 198. Pedro Paranaguá, A Comprehensive Framework for Copyright Protection and 
Access to Knowledge: From a Brazilian Perspective and Beyond, in SOUTH PERSPECTIVE - 
HOW DEVELOPING COUNTRIES CAN MANAGE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS TO 
MAXIMIZE ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE 103, 106 (Carlos M. Correa & Xuan Li eds., 2009); 
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b. Remedial Measures Available to the BRIC Countries. 
Developing countries labor under intense pressures from 
developed countries to duplicate the very barriers to digitally 
integrated scientific research that have been erected in OECD 
countries. Instead, the BRIC countries in particular should 
collectively resist these pressures and self-consciously adopt 
limitations and exceptions to copyright and related rights laws 
that would digitally empower their own scientific research 
communities without necessarily violating the relevant 
international intellectual property agreements. If these 
countries, and other emerging economies, marshaled the political 
will and governance capacity to undertake such reforms, their 
leadership in this area might give them a comparative advantage 
at a time when local scientific and technical innovation has 
begun to flourish in many key industrial sectors. 
Accordingly, two fundamental recommendations are as 
follows: 
− First, the BRIC countries should codify the idea
expression dichotomynow established in the TRIPS 
Agreementas a central subject matter exception,199 and 
they should clarify that the legislative intent is to implement 
this exception at least as broadly as U.S. federal appellate 
courts routinely do.200 
− Second, because the use of automated knowledge tools 
in general and computational science in particular, requires 
scientists to reproduce entire articles from scientific journals; 
to extract excerpts of varying lengths from them; and to 
incorporate large extracts of data into their digital research 
tools for data mining, virtual experiments, and other forms of 
digital manipulation,201 the BRIC countries will need a broad 
and sweeping exemption for scientific research uses of 
literature and data. The clarity of such an exemption should 
require no gloss, no fine print, and no elaborately contrived 
carve-outs.202 
                                                          
Mizukami & Lemos, supra note 33, at 4448. 
 199. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 9.2. 
 200. Reichman & Okediji, supra note 23, at 2324 (citing authorities). 
 201. Id. at 28; see, e.g., Victoria Stodden, Enabling Reproducible Research: Open 
Licensing for Scientific Innovation, 13 INTL J. COMM. L. & POLY, Winter 2009, at 1, 24
25 (How far the fair use exception extends into entire research compendia is not clear 
since the contours of fair use of copyrighted scientific material are not clearly 
delineated.). 
 202. Reichman & Okediji, supra note 23, at 2930. 
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The Max Planck Institute has recently proposed that a broad 
and general exemption of this kind should allow use and reuse of 
published scientific materials for virtually any scientific purpose, 
with express legitimatization of storage, archiving, data 
extraction, linking, and the like.203 Such a reform should further 
clarify that scientists remain free to subject any published 
articles, and any scientific work made publicly available online, 
to data mining procedures, data manipulation by automated 
knowledge tools, including virtual scientific experimentation, 
without any constraint other than attribution under the norms of 
science.204 Any database protection laws that the BRIC countries 
were unwise enough to enact (by, for example, succumbing to 
pressures for bilateral agreements with the European Union) 
would have to be similarly aligned with a broad copyright 
exemption for uses of scientific literature.205 
Beyond these fundamental policy positions bearing on 
scientific research, the BRIC countries should revise and expand 
their copyright exceptions for libraries and educational 
institutions generally, in order to fully exploit the policy space 
deriving from flexibilities set out in the TRIPS Agreement and 
other relevant treaties, especially the WIPO Copyright Treaty of 
1996.206 In this connection, the library community has been 
developing a plan of action to promote access to knowledge in 
developing countries, with particular regard to eliminating legal 
barriers to cross-border flows of books, periodicals, and other 
information in both the print media and the online 
environment.207 Cooperating countries that implemented these 
                                                          
 203. Reto M. Hilty et al., Comments by the Max Planck Institute for Intellectual 
Property, Competition and Tax Law on the European Commissions Green Paper: 
Copyright in the Knowledge Economy (Max Planck Inst. for Intellectual Prop., 
Competition & Tax Law, Research Paper No. 08-05, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1317730.  
 204. Reichman & Okediji, supra note 23, at 30. For further nuances concerning 
derivative works and possible downstream applications to commercial products justifying 
use of compensatory liability rules, see id. at 3032. 
 205. Id. at 30. 
 206. See WCT, supra note 193, pmbl. & art. 10. The accompanying Agreed 
Statement concerning Article 10 enables contracting parties to carry forward and 
appropriately extend into the digital environment limitations and exceptions in their 
national laws which have been considered acceptable under the Berne 
Convention . . . [and] to devise new exceptions and limitations that are appropriate in 
the digital network environment. 
 207. See Electronic Information for Libraries (eIFL), eIFL Handbook on Copyright 
and Related Issues for Libraries, http://www.eifl.net/cps/sections/services/eifl-ip/issues/ 
handbook/handbook-e (last visited Nov. 20, 2009) (listing Recommendations for a 
Development Agenda in WIPO in order to foster a greater understanding of the 
importance of flexibilities, especially for developing and least-developed countries, and 
balanced IP education to include copyright exceptions and limitations, library copyright 
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proposals could gradually build a contractually created space in 
which their domestic arrangements accommodating science, 
education, and libraries were given mutual and reciprocal 
recognition.208 Equally essential are clear legal measures to 
enable the bulk purchasing of foreign educational texts on 
reasonable terms and conditions.209 
The BRIC countries, together with governments in other 
emerging economies, should also consider the potential 
advantages of adopting a fair use provision that would enable 
courts to deal with fact-specific situations falling outside the 
codified exceptions to copyright laws exclusive rights, which 
invariably occur in practice. A fair use option would create a 
buffer zone available when other provisions favoring research, 
education, and libraries appeared unclear or uncertain and yet 
the use in question served the larger public interest without 
undue harm to authors.210  
Properly administered, a fair use provision could justify ad 
hoc awards of compensation to resolve apparent conflicts between 
private and public interests in hard cases. It would also help to 
attenuate potential conflicts between copyright laws exclusive 
rights and fundamental human rights, especially free speech, 
and the overriding objectives and principles of the TRIPS 
Agreement, as set out in Articles 7 and 8.211 
However, implicit in any serious discussion of the trend 
toward adopting fair use regimes outside the English-speaking 
countries is the fundamental need to reconcile broad exceptions 
in domestic copyright laws with the three-step test governing 
limitations and exceptions in international copyright law,212 as 
set out in Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement,213 and further 
elucidated in Article 10 of the WCT (together with the relevant 
                                                          
issues, the public domain, fair model laws and pro-competitive licensing regimes). 
 208. Cf. Grosse Ruse-Khan, supra note 180 (proposing ceilings on exclusive rights of 
authors); Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 36, at 429 (discussing possible treaties between 
universities to regulate the sharing of government-funded research data); Peter K. Yu, 
Access to Medicines, BRIC Alliances, and Collective Action, 34 AMER. J.L. & MED. 345, 345
87 (2008) (proposing coordination strategies for BRIC countries to increase access to 
medicines). 
 209. See, e.g., Okediji, supra note 37, at 17886. 
 210. Reichman & Okediji, supra note 23, at 26. 
 211. Id. at 2627; Peter K. Yu, The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS 
Agreement, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 979, 1006 (2009) (describing how these provisions may be 
interpreted to facilitate development and to protect the public interest). 
 212. Ruth Okediji, Toward an International Fair Use Regime, 39 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNATL L. 75, 149 (2000). 
 213. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 13. 
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Agreed Statement thereto).214 Fortunately, the Max Planck 
Institute, following exhaustive discussions among some thirty 
experts, has prepared a Declaration on the Three-Step Test that 
seeks to accomplish this task.215 Building on the WCT 
Preamble,216 it would: 
− Mandate that courts applying the three-step test of 
Article 13 in copyright cases take into account the interests 
of third parties, including individual and collective interests 
of the general public, and not just the interests of rights 
owners;217 
− Avoid prioritizing any one step, or requiring that the 
answer to all steps should be yes, but would instead require 
a judicial balancing of the different prongs, as occurs under 
U.S. fair use law;218 
− Give particular weight to unauthorized uses that are 
underpinned by fundamental rights219 and other public 
                                                          
 214. WCT, supra note 193, art. 10 (reiterating the three-step test of TRIPS art. 13). 
The accompanying Agreed Statement of the diplomatic conference that adopted the WCT 
confirms that Article 10 allows signatories to devise new limitations and exceptions for 
the digital environment. See supra note 206. 
 215. Three-Step Test, supra note 180, at 71112. 
 216. WCT, supra note 193, pmbl. (Recognizing the need to maintain a balance 
between the rights of authors and the larger public interest, particularly education, 
research and access to information, as reflected in the Berne Convention.). 
 217. Three-Step Test, supra note 180, at 712; cf. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, 
art. 30 (exceptions to exclusive rights of patentees). 
 218. Three-Step Test, supra note 180, at 709, 711. U.S. copyright law provides: 
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair 
use the factors to be considered shall include 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work. 
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). But see MIHÁLY FICSOR, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND THE 
INTERNET 9192 (2002) (arguing that the legislative history of the Berne Convention 
prohibits this approach). 
 219. Three-Step Test, supra note 180, at 712; see HUGENHOLTZ & OKEDIJI, supra note 
180, at 21 (describing some decisions in European courts that have allowed unauthorized 
uses); LANGE & POWELL, supra note 181, at 126 (analyzing the tensions between the First 
Amendment and copyright protection); Laurence R. Helfer, Toward a Human Rights 
Framework for Intellectual Property, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 971, 1017 (2007) (In 
particular, there have been a number of decisions in the field of copyright in which the 
freedom of expression has been invoked to justify a use that is not covered by an exception 
provided for in the law. (quoting Christophe Geiger, Fundamental Rights, a Safeguard 
for the Coherence of Intellectual Property Law?, 35 INTL REV. INTELL. PROP. & 
COMPETITION L. 268, 277 (2004))). 
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interests, notably in scientific progress and cultural or 
economic development;220 
− Seek to promote competition, especially in secondary 
markets, by a correct balancing of interests, but without 
making the three-step test a proxy for competition law;221 and 
− Expressly recognize that adequate compensation may 
be less than market pricing, where other public concerns are 
at stake, including third party interests or the general public 
interest.222 
The BRIC countries could set an example for other 
developing countries by incorporating these proposals into their 
domestic laws, by supporting their incorporation into the WIPO 
Development Agenda, and, if necessary, by defending the tenets 
of the Declaration in WTO dispute resolution proceedings if they 
were challenged.223 
Finally, no reform of the copyright laws limitations and 
exceptions would be worth much in practice if the resulting 
provisions could not be enforced online or if publishers could 
simply override them by contract. In regard to the online 
environment, the WCT of 1996 clearly preserved a signatory 
states rights to maintain all limitations and exceptions 
permitted by law when implementing international obligations 
to protect copyrightable works transmitted via digital networks 
by means of TPMs and DRMs.224 However, the implementing 
legislation in the United States, i.e., the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA), declined to exercise this treaty-given 
power,225 while the European Unions implementing legislation, 
the Infosoc Directive of 2001,226 simply avoided the issue, which 
was tantamount to the same result.227 
Developing countries should take exactly the opposite path 
by exercising the inherent power of WCT signatories to 
implement all limitations and exceptions permitted by law in 
the online environment.228 The first step is to enact legislation 
that expressly applies limitations and exceptions favoring 
scientific research, education, and libraries to works transmitted 
                                                          
 220. Three-Step Test, supra note 180, at 712; see Chon, supra note 37, at 820. 
 221. Three-Step Test, supra note 180, at 70910. 
 222. Id. at 710. 
 223. See infra text accompanying notes 33134. 
 224. See WCT, supra note 193, art. 11. 
 225. 17 U.S.C. §§ 120105 (2006). 
 226. Council Directive 2001/29/EC, art. 6(4), 2001 O.J. (L 167) (EC).  
 227. Reichman, Dinwoodie & Samuelson, supra note 180, at 104245. 
 228. WCT, supra note 193, art. 11. 
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over digital networks, irrespective of the TPMs and DRMs that 
otherwise regulate such transmissions. The next step is to 
further adopt measures that effectively enable the beneficiaries 
of these exceptions to enforce them despite the electronic fences 
and digital locks that impair access to protected works in 
cyberspace.229  
This result can be achieved, for example, by means of a 
system of electronic locks and keys to break through the 
electronic fences for specified purposes,230 or by resort to the less 
costly and burdensome reverse notice and takedown procedure 
that I and Professors Dinwoodie and Samuelson have proposed 
elsewhere.231 The latter procedure enables would-be privileged 
users to oblige copyright proprietors to make relevant materials 
available without the users having to cross the electronic fence or 
enter the digitally locked gateway at all.232 
Needless to say, neither approach will suffice if copyright 
proprietors can override applicable limitations and exceptions by 
contract, especially one-sided electronic contracts that regulate 
lawful access to digitally transmitted works. Hence, developing 
country legislators need to ensure that none of the key exceptions 
favoring research, education, and libraries can be waived or 
overridden by contract, especially in the online environment.233 
Arguably, it is the BRIC countries, and other emerging 
economies, that have the greatest interest in treating access to 
scientific knowledge and educational materials as a domestic and 
global public good, one which should not be privatized beyond 
limits set by domestic law and policy.234 While operating within 
                                                          
 229. See Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright 
Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345 (2004) (advocating 
administrative measures to enforce limitations and exceptions online); Reichman, 
Dinwoodie & Samuelson, supra note 180, at 1003 (discussing the importance of a 
commitment to ensuring that copyright limitations and exceptions are as available when 
copyrighted works are protected by TPMs as when they are not). 
 230. Reichman & Okediji, supra note 23, at 34. 
 231. Reichman, Dinwoodie & Samuelson, supra note 180, at 103238 (proposing 
judicially enforceable measures to extract privileged matter without the user having to 
enter digitally locked gateways). 
 232. Id. 
 233. See, e.g., Hilty et al., supra note 203, at 3; Reichman & Okediji, supra note 23, 
at 36. 
 234. See Mario Cimoli, Giovanni Dosi & Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Political Economy of 
Capabilities Accumulation: The Past and Future of Policies for Industrial Development, in 
INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CAPABILITIES 
ACCUMULATION 1, 45 (Mario Cimoli et al. eds., 2009); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Knowledge as a 
Global Public Good, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS 308 (Inge Kaul et al. eds., 1999) 
(advocating the perspective that knowledge is a public good that should be protected by 
the state); cf. Maskus & Reichman, supra note 2, at 4144. 
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the confines of existing international intellectual property laws, 
it behooves these countriesboth at the domestic and regional 
levelsto play a leadership role in implementing and amplifying 
the flexibilities set out in the relevant international conventions, 
with a view to benefiting their own research and educational 
communities. 
At the multilateral level, these countries should evaluate the 
extent to which their own needs for access to knowledge oblige 
them to support WIPO Development Agenda goals consonant with 
those needs, in opposition to the high-protectionist policies favored 
by the United States and the EU.235 Bold legislative initiatives in 
domestic laws on these matters could thus help to set and define the 
international copyright law agenda for the next several decades. 
3. Measures Concerning Competition Law and Misuse. 
There is nearly universal recognition of the need to redefine the 
border between intellectual property rights and competition law 
in a manner conducive to promoting worldwide markets for 
technology.236 Here the high- and middle-income developing 
countries need to formulate competition laws and policies to 
ensure that foreign technologies and know-how flow to local 
markets under reasonable terms and conditions and at prices 
local entrepreneurs can afford.237 In so doing, they should fully 
exploit the competition law exceptions available under the TRIPS 
Agreement238 and draw upon solutions and proposals emanating 
                                                          
 235. See supra text accompanying note 78; infra notes 30103 and accompanying text.  
 236. See, e.g., Josef Drexl, The Critical Role of Competition Law in Preserving Public 
Goods in Conflict with Intellectual Property Rights, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND 
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, 
supra note 2, at 709, 71718; Eleanor M. Fox, Can Antitrust Policy Protect the Global 
Commons from the Excesses of IPRs?, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF 
TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, supra note 2, at 
758, 767 (In a world of global markets and world ramifications of local action, both 
antitrust and intellectual property law cry out for global conceptions.); see also Sean 
Flynn, Aidan Hollis & Mike Palmedo, An Economic Justification for Open Access to 
Essential Medicine Patents in Developing Countries, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 184, 19193 
(2009) (suggesting that developing countries adopt legal standards, especially competition 
law doctrines, to drive down prices in competitive markets). 
 237. Reichman, supra note 18, at 161. 
 238. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, arts. 8.2, 40. See Mark D. Janis, Minimal 
Standards for Patent-Related Antitrust Law under TRIPS, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 
GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
REGIME, supra note 2, at 774, 77680; Hanns Ullrich, Expansionist Intellectual Property 
Protection and Reductionist Competition Rules: A TRIPS Perspective, in INTERNATIONAL 
PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY REGIME, supra note 2, at 726, 730; see also Shubha Ghosh, Comment II: 
Competitive Baselines for Intellectual Property Systems, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS 
AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, 
supra note 2, at 793, 80711 (concentrating on the possibilities afforded to members to 
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from both past and present practices in OECD countries and 
elsewhere, given the political will and skill to do so. 
However, resorting to competition law and policy has so far 
proved difficult for most developing countries. In part, this 
reluctance may stem from the complex economic analysis, high 
transaction costs, and regulatory skills associated with the 
practice of competition law in the most developed countries.239 
Moreover, key differences between EU practice, which 
emphasizes measures to prevent abuse of a dominant position, 
anduntil recentlythe less aggressive stance of the U.S. 
authorities, who seek evidence of actual or intended 
monopolization,240 may hinder clear thinking about the relevant 
problems in developing countries. Both the EU and U.S. regimes 
depend on proof of market power, although long-standing (but 
increasingly disfavored) common law precedents in patent law 
allow U.S. courts to suspend enforcement of valid patents for acts 
of misuse, even in the absence of market power.241 
Besides these technical intricacies, policymakers in 
developing countries that become serious about the interface 
between intellectual property and competition law must make 
high-level decisions about the goals of competition law in general, 
i.e., efficiency or fairness, or some combination of both.242 They 
must then reconcile their versions of competition law with the 
incentives to innovate that flow from the exclusive rights of 
intellectual property laws.243 Here again they may be deterred by 
prevailing tendencies in developed countries to view competition 
law and intellectual property law as complementary means of 
                                                          
limit intellectual property rights through competition law and policy indirectly under 
Articles 6, 13, 30, and 31 of the TRIPS Agreement). 
 239. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 19792007 (examining the complex 
historical enforcement of antitrust laws to protect intellectual property rights in the 
United States). 
 240. See Arezzo, supra note 133, at 45865 (analyzing the differences between EU 
and U.S. antitrust laws). 
 241. Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 199192 (explaining that the U.S. Supreme 
Courts diminishing hostility toward tying arrangements and reduced concern about 
anticompetitive effects resulted in an increasing insisten[ce] that market power be 
explicitly proven); see Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 4243 (2006) 
(replacing the presumption of illegality in a tying arrangement involving a patented 
product with the requirement of proof of power in the relevant market). See generally 
Thomas F. Cotter, Misuse, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 901 (2007) (tracing the development of the 
misuse doctrine).  
 242. See Fox, supra note 236, at 76869 (describing U.S. antitrust laws as being 
guided by efficiency rather than fairness principles and suggesting that the goals would 
coincide upon limiting immunities); Ullrich, supra note 238, at 74748 (detailing the shift 
of competition law enforcement toward efficiency-based innovation). 
 243. See GHIDINI, supra note 109, at 11415. 
(4) REICHMAN 12/22/2009 10:14:45 PM 
1162 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [46:4 
mutually promoting social welfare, rather than as disparate 
regimes in conflict with one another.244 The latter view more 
readily supports doctrines that override intellectual property 
rights, such as the essential facilities doctrine, much invoked in 
European scholarship and much harder to obtain in practice than 
in theory.245 
Although developing countries have lagged behind in this 
field, both India and China have recently begun to formulate 
competition law and policy with a view to circumscribing the 
exclusive rights of intellectual property laws. For example, India 
has adopted patent misuse provisions that limit a licensees 
ability to acquire or use any article other than the patented 
article or to use any process other than the patented process, 
with a view to prohibiting any form of tying.246 Refusals to deal 
may also trigger the grant of compulsory licenses under Indias 
current framework,247 as will undersupplying the market or 
charging excessively high prices.248 
Similarly, Chinas third amendment of its Patent Law 
seems to have expressly codified the power to grant compulsory 
licenses for abusive practices with regard to both patents and 
utility models. Articles 48 through 54 reportedly envision a 
compulsory license for abuse, including failure to work, within 
the purview of Paris Convention Article 5A, or for 
anticompetitive effects of the patent monopoly that should be 
reduced or removed.249 Such a license may also issue, under 
Article 54, for refusals to deal on reasonable terms or within a 
reasonable period of time.250 
                                                          
 244. See Drexl, supra note 236, at 71617 (In principle, IPRs and competition 
laws . . . are two complementary instruments for the establishment and preservation of 
competitive markets.); Fox, supra note 236, at 764 (asserting that many nations 
antitrust laws are ineffective in policing monopolies granted by IPRs because they neither 
prohibit excessive pricing nor recognize the refusal to license intellectual property as an 
offense); Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 1979 (explaining that while both IP and antitrust 
policy seek to promote economic welfare, they do so in different ways, causing the relation 
between the two to be unstable and problematic). 
 245. See Coco, supra note 133, at 20; Frischmann & Weber Waller, supra note 110, at 
5764 (discussing the European cases). 
 246. Kapczynski, supra note 4 (quoting The Patents Act, 1970, No. 39, Acts of 
Parliament, 1970, § 140(iii)); Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of 
the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2009) (rejecting 
efficiency claims and demonstrating how tying generally harms consumer welfare). 
 247. The Patents Act, 1970, No. 39, Acts of Parliament, 1970, § 84(6)(ii), (iv), as 
amended by The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002, No. 38, Acts of Parliament, 2002. 
 248. The Patents Act, 1970, No. 39, Acts of Parliament, 1970, § 84, as amended by The 
Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002, No. 38, Acts of Parliament, 2002; Kapczynski, supra note 4. 
 249. See Feng, supra note 9, at 99102. 
 250. Id. at 100. 
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The measures adopted in India and China may serve to 
stimulate other emerging economies that have so far played 
virtually no formative role in this area at all. If so, developing 
countries may also discover needed self-help measures that 
competition law might afford if and when market failures of 
various kinds impede access to green technologies, as many fear 
will occur.251  
Policymakers should accordingly consider early U.S. cases 
that emphasize fairness over efficiency.252 They should also adopt 
both the abuse of a dominant position approach found in EU 
competition law and flexible doctrines of patent misuse, which 
could reach refusals to deal, excessive prices, and undersupply of 
the market, without a showing of market power.253 But such 
measures must be applied equally to domestic and foreign firms, 
without discrimination,254 which could raise serious obstacles in 
many emerging economies. 
C. Revitalizing a Petrified Intellectual Property System 
The foregoing exercise attempted to illustrate how the 
BRIC countries and other emerging economies could forge 
needed solutions to bourgeoning intellectual property problems 
that developed countries have either neglected or failed to 
resolve. In this endeavor, BRIC countries would be motivated by 
the greater stake they now have in what Carolyn Deere has 
felicitously called the Implementation Game,255 owing to 
steadily mounting payoffs from strategic uses of locally 
generated knowledge goods. By carefully reevaluating their own 
intellectual property needs in the light of growing technological 
                                                          
 251. See, e.g., Abbott, supra note 40, at 20; Maskus & Okediji, supra note 40, at 78; 
Reichman et al., supra note 40, at 2833. 
 252. See Fox, supra note 236, at 76061. 
 253. See Paris Convention, supra note 88, art. 5A; G.H.C. BODENHAUSEN, GUIDE TO 
THE APPLICATION OF THE PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL 
PROPERTY AS REVISED AT STOCKHOLM IN 1967, at 7071 (1968) (pointing out 
flexibilities in the Paris Convention allowing nations to define and legislate against 
abuses which might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by a 
patent); Cotter, supra note 241, at 90809; see also Reichman with Hasenzahl, supra 
note 111, at 21 (noting U.S. practice of nonenforcement, used to correct misuses of 
exclusive rights). 
 254. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, arts. 3, 4, 8.2, 40 (requiring members to 
accord no less favorable treatment to other members with regard to the protection of 
intellectual property); Paris Convention, supra note 88, art. 2(1) (declaring that nationals 
of any country of the Union shall have the same protection and legal remedy with regard 
to industrial property as in any of other countries of the Union). 
 255. See DEERE, supra note 30, at 3. 
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capacities,256 they could begin to overhaul and reshape an out of 
balance system driven by ideology and power politics257 in order 
to address the real conditions of creativity and innovation in 
todays digitally empowered universe of scientific discourse.258  
Once embarked along such a path, policymakers in these 
countries would discover the growing importance of publicly 
accessible infrastructure in the development of new and complex 
technological paradigms.259 They would profit from the problem-
solving capacities of liability rules, especially when applied to 
upstream research outputs and tools that lack clear market 
values and that lend themselves to multiple downstream 
applications of unknown or uncertain value.260 They would strive 
for more fluid and balanced interchanges between public and 
private goods in knowledge economies driven by both heavy 
public investment in basic research and by private investment in 
translating that research into workable commercial products.261 
                                                          
 256. See Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 7 (stressing policy space within TRIPS 
flexibilities to promote local creative and technological skills). 
 257. For evidence of the Andean Communitys successful efforts in this regard, see 
Helfer et al., supra note 47, at 1636. 
 258. See David, supra note 72, at 82 (arguing that the Hopi word koyaanisqatsi, 
meaning life out of balance, can be used to describe the international regime of 
intellectual property rights due to the dangerously altered . . . balance between private 
rights and the public domain in data and information). 
 259. See, e.g., Frischmann, supra note 64, at 92326 (developing a theory that strong 
economic arguments exist for managing and sustaining openly accessible intellectual 
infrastructure); Lee, Contracting to Preserve, supra note 73, at 89394 (suggesting that 
public institutions have freedom to effectuate norms favoring wide dissemination of 
research technologies through a new model of consideration-based patent regulation); 
Lee, Distributive Commons, supra note 73, at 2122 (comparing health technologies to 
infrastructure). See generally BENKLER, supra note 176, at 3 (claiming that the 
information economy is entering a new stage, which he calls the networked information 
economy). 
 260. See, e.g., REICHMAN, DEDEURWAERDERE & UHLIR, supra note 73, ch. 2 
(proposing compensatory liability regime for commercial applications of materials 
deposited for research purposes in culture collections); Victoria Henson-Apollonio, The 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA): 
The Standard Material Transfer Agreement as Implementation of a Limited 
Compensatory Liability Regime, in GENE PATENTS AND COLLABORATIVE LICENSING 
MODELS, supra note 24, at 289, 28993 (describing recent effort to facilitate the 
exchange of crop germplasm for commercial food and agricultural purposes through 
compensatory liability regimes); Rai et al., supra note 132, at 26 (proposing liability 
rule for pre-competitive pooling of small molecule libraries for high throughput 
screening); Reichman & Lewis, supra note 159, at 34548 (proposing use of liability 
rules to stimulate investment in traditional knowledge). See generally Reichman, supra 
note 53, at 177677 (proposing compensatory liability regime for small-scale 
innovation). 
 261. See, e.g., Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 30001; So et al., supra note 41, at 
207882 (describing the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 and examining the potential problems for 
developing countries modeling legislation on the Act); V.C. Vivekanandan, The Public
Private Dichotomy of Intellectual Property: Recommendations for the WIPO Development 
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And they could play a unique role in developing global 
administrative law norms as well.262 
In sum, the BRIC countries, pursuing their own self-interest 
in economic growth with suitable coordination strategies,263 could 
conceivably break the maximalists stranglehold on intellectual 
property lawmaking exercises, which aims mainly to preserve a 
knowledge cartels comparative advantage in existing 
technological outputs at the expense of future innovation 
requiring more subtle forms of nurture.264 In so doing, the BRIC 
countries would devise and test new approaches and solutions 
that could redound to the benefit of technology-exporting 
countries everywhere, most of which seem incapable of reforming 
their increasingly dysfunctional innovation systems at the 
present time.265 
IV. OBSTACLES TO IMPLEMENTING 
COUNTER-HARMONIZATION INITIATIVES 
The question this optimistic portrait begs, however, is why 
developing countries have not already taken longer strides in this 
direction when implementing their responses to the challenges 
posed after the 1994 adoption of the TRIPS Agreement. Carolyn 
Deeres recent efforts to answer that very question afford a bleak 
and cautionary picture of the obstacles that stand in the way of 
autonomous intellectual property reforms.266 
She shows, for example, that strong economic pressures, 
including the threat of trade sanctions and other diplomatic 
measures, combined with offers of future trade concessions, were 
more likely to produce TRIPS-plus provisions in FTAs than 
efforts to flesh out existing flexibilities in the TRIPS 
Agreement.267 High-level lobbying by specialized knowledge 
communities, backed by one-sided technical assistance from 
                                                          
Agenda, in IMPLEMENTING THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATIONS 
DEVELOPMENT AGENDA, supra note 78, at 131, 13234. 
 262. Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 2125. 
 263. See, e.g., Yu, supra note 208, at 37083 (stressing coordination strategies such 
as South-South Alliances, North-South Cooperation, and use of the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Process); see also Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 1721 (stressing importance of 
coordination in international lawmaking exercises concerning IPRs in general). 
 264. Maskus & Reichman, supra note 2, at 3, 19. 
 265. Reichman & Dreyfuss, supra note 12, at 12229. 
 266. See generally DEERE, supra note 30 (revealing the international pressures and 
national political dynamics which resulted in the variation of responses to TRIPS in 
developing countries). 
 267. Id. at 16467. 
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WIPO and government agencies in developed countries,268 further 
shap[ed] developing country perceptions of the political climate 
and their room for [maneuvering] within it,269 although 
countervailing efforts by NGOs, academics, and others became 
more effective over time.270 
On the domestic front, a lack of technical expertise 
hampered many developing countries.271 As Professor Dreyfuss 
observes, Astute lawyers should be able to utilize these [TRIPS] 
flexibilities . . . . The rub, however, is the need for astute 
lawyering . . . [which in turn depends on nurturing] a legal 
community capable of utilizing the Agreements flexibilities 
effectively.272 
Even when the relevant expertise emerged over time, the 
lack of internal government coordination among agencies affected 
by intellectual property law and policy left too much power in the 
hands of national IP offices, which were more likely to share the 
views of their foreign counterparts, and also left non-expert 
government officials more vulnerable to pressures from foreign 
governments.273 In many developing countries, parliamentary 
debate and public discussion about intellectual property issues 
were negligible, which delegated policy framing to national 
                                                          
 268. See, e.g., SISULE F. MUSUNGU & GRAHAM DUTFIELD, MULTILATERAL 
AGREEMENTS AND A TRIPS-PLUS WORLD: THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
ORGANISATION (WIPO) 1617 (2003), available at http://www.quno.org/geneva/pdf/ 
economic/Issues/Multilateral-Agreements-in-TRIPS-plus-English.pdf. 
 269. DEERE, supra note 30, at 16768, 180 (emphasizing ideational power as an 
explanation to the varying actions of developing countries and describing capacity-
building as the area of clearest intersection between economic and ideational power in the 
TRIPS implementation game); see also DRAHOS WITH BRAITHWAITE, supra note 12, at 90
93; GRAHAM DUTFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, TRADE AND BIODIVERSITY 12 
(2000) (attributing the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement, given the ambivalent if not 
hostile stance of many developing countries, to the promise of favorable agreements in 
areas such as textiles and agriculture); Peter Drahos, BITS and BIPS: Bilateralism in 
Intellectual Property, 4 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 791, 80304 (2001) (revealing the danger 
of developing countries being led into a highly complex multilateral/bilateral web that is 
eroding their ability to set and interpret intellectual property standards domestically). 
 270. DEERE, supra note 30, at 17279; see also Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: 
The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property 
Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INTL L. 1, 2327 (2004) (observing that NGOs and developing 
countries began to regard TRIPS as a coerced agreement and describing how, in the 
wake of TRIPS, NGOs aided developing nations in intellectual property lawmaking). 
 271. DEERE, supra note 30, at 197. In Africa, this lack of expertise at the national 
level led to the delegation of intellectual property matters to regional entities that were 
particularly susceptible to high-protectionist pressures from WIPO and OECD countries 
generally. See id. at 21920. 
 272. Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 7. 
 273. See DEERE, supra note 30, at 21120; see also Helfer et al., supra note 47, at 16
32 (documenting more successful regional coordination efforts in the Andean 
Community). 
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associations of patent and trademark agents and copyright 
lawyers, staff of national intellectual property offices, and 
national legal scholars.274 Weak governance and widespread 
corruption were, of course, ancillary factors in most of the 
developing world,275 with some notable exceptions in the Andean 
Community.276  
One may then ask why matters should be different in the 
future. The answer is largely rooted in the real economic and 
technological capacities being attained in countries such as India, 
China, Brazil, and others. Such real world experience breeds, 
first, greater awareness of both the strengths and weaknesses of 
conventional intellectual property norms and policies 
encountered along the way, and second, a greater confidence in 
the ability of local entrepreneurs and policymakers to tailor 
future decisions and positions in their national interest.277  
There is, of course, a countervailing risk that greater 
technical capacity at the national level, especially in the BRIC 
countries, could breed domestic lobbying pressures favoring 
protectionist measures that might further distort, rather than 
rebalance, the international intellectual property system.278 Also 
relevant is the continued ability of NGO advocacy initiatives, 
                                                          
 274. DEERE, supra note 30, at 207. Professor Gervais points to the perception of 
arcane club rules beyond the written word of the treaties, with the risk that the 
intellectual property club can create distance between policy makers and their countrys 
larger public interest. E-mail from Daniel Gervais, Professor of Law, Vanderbilt 
University Law School, to Jerome Reichman, Professor of Law, Duke University School of 
Law (Sept. 14, 2009) (on file with Author). 
 275. See DEERE, supra note 30, at 198 (noting the impact of weak public 
administration and corruption on TRIPS implementation in developing countries). 
 276. See Helfer et al., supra note 47, at 1632. 
 277. See, e.g., GORDON C.K. CHEUNG, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA 63
82 (2009) (describing the quantitative and legal measures taken by the Chinese 
government to counteract rampant counterfeiting of intellectual property); Allarakhia, 
supra note 178, at 11 (As economies in emerging markets enter the biopharmeceutical 
arena, it is essential that developed economies share not only technological expertise, but 
also their experiences regarding knowledge production and dissemination.); Mizukami & 
Lemos, supra note 33, at 4445 (analyzing the tecnobrega industry in Brazil and its 
implications for intellectual property protection); Yu, supra note 208, at 34648 (exploring 
how the BRIC countries can promote access to essential medicines in the less developed 
world through collaboration with other developing countries); see also Shamnad Basheer 
& Annalisa Primi, The WIPO Development Agenda: Factoring in the Technologically 
Proficient Developing Countries, in IMPLEMENTING THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
ORGANIZATIONS DEVELOPMENT AGENDA, supra note 78, at 100, 10104 (cautioning 
against a polarized view of developing countries in the context of technological capability); 
Pedro Paranaguá, Strategies to Implement WIPOs Development Agenda: A Brazilian 
Perspective and Beyond, in IMPLEMENTING THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
ORGANIZATIONS DEVELOPMENT AGENDA, supra note 78, at 140, 14042 (focusing on the 
role of NGOs in implementing the WIPO Development Agenda). 
 278. I am indebted to Laurence Helfer for this cautionary note. 
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such as the Access to Knowledge Campaign,279 to reach 
policymakers in developing country capitals, despite funding cuts 
due to economic recession and to pressures from high-protectionist 
interests on foundations previously supportive of such initiatives. 
Of particular importance are the lessons to be learned from 
the coordination and governance strategies of those BRIC 
countries that have most succeeded in resisting foreign pressures 
for TRIPS-plus agreements and legislation while maintaining an 
increasingly autonomous policy of their own.280 Here empirical 
evidence showing the ability of Andean Community institutions 
to resist attempts to influence the formation of regional 
intellectual property laws and policies on numerous occasions 
sets an impressive example.281 But regional coordination, a key 
aspect of Professor Kapczynskis own counter-harmonization 
strategy,282 is often difficult to achieve and risks becoming fragile 
over time.283 Moreover, that very regional process can be captured 
and turned against the interests of national innovation systems 
needing broadened TRIPS flexibilities, as Carolyn Deere 
documents in the case of francophone Africa.284 
To offset these risks, Professor Kapczynski buttresses her 
counter-harmonization thesis with supplementary strategies of 
fragmentation and mimicry.285 Fragmentation entails the 
adoption of unique or semi-unique national variations in law that 
create legal friction, impeding the flow of the transnational 
circuits that undermine local autonomy.286 Mimicry, in contrast, 
entails a dynamic reworking of transplanted IP norms, which is 
cast as a process of sharing or borrowing.287 
For these and other related proposals to succeed, however, at 
least three supporting institutional factors become relevant, if 
                                                          
 279. See, e.g., Kapczynski, Access to Knowledge, supra note 196; Paranaguá, supra 
note 277. 
 280. See, e.g., DEERE, supra note 30, at 199, 21118 (describing Brazil as the country 
that exhibited the highest degree of coordination domestically on IP policy matters and 
that also achieved the greatest coordination of its external IP relations). 
 281. See Helfer et al., supra note 47, at 1632. 
 282. Kapczynski, supra note 4; see also Reichman & Dreyfuss, supra note 12, at 177
22 (suggesting new approaches to existing IP problems rather than premature patent 
harmonization efforts). 
 283. For example, the Andean Community has lost Venezuela and Bolivia, and may 
be disintegrating. See Helfer et al., supra note 47. 
 284.  See, e.g., DEERE, supra note 30, at 24086 (describing experience of the African 
Organization for Intellectual Property (OAPI)). 
 285. Kapczynski, supra note 4. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id.; see also Paul Edward Geller, Legal Transplants in International Copyright: 
Some Problems of Method, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 199 (1994). 
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not indispensable. These are: 1) the need for interagency 
coordination at the national, and, ideally, regional levels; 2) the 
need to establish facts on the ground in the domestic laws of the 
emerging economies; and 3) the willingness of the relevant 
governments to defend national variations of TRIPS flexibilities 
before WTO dispute resolution tribunals. 
A. Interagency Coordination of Intellectual Property Law and 
Policy 
In the late 1990s, under a seed grant from a unit of UNDP, 
Ruth Okediji, Jayasharee Watal, and I argued that internal 
governmental coordination of intellectual property policy would 
be crucial to formulating appropriate domestic strategies to 
implement international intellectual property standards under 
the TRIPS Agreement.288 Because, in our view, these new IP 
standards would affect all of a countrys creative and industrial 
sectors in different ways, depending on its specific national 
assets and liabilities in each sector, there could be no internal 
one size fits all solutions, despite external pressures for such an 
approach.289 Rather, the challenge for governments was to take 
stock of those same national assets and liabilities and then to 
fashion implementing strategies that would enable each 
developing country to maximize potential gains from intellectual 
property protection over time while minimizing the social costs.290 
Our central recommendation was accordingly that 
developing country governments needed to form and staff 
ongoing interagency coordinating committees on intellectual 
property law and policy, in order to advise policymakers about 
the implications for economic and social welfare as a whole of 
every proposed legislative or administrative decision concerning 
compliance with the TRIPS Agreement and related issues.291 
Above all, it seemed essential that these local coordinating 
committees would oversee the activities of national intellectual 
property offices, while pooling their resources at the regional 
level, in order to maintain coherent and effective negotiating 
                                                          
 288. See Jerome Reichman, Jayasharee Watal & Ruth Ghana Okediji, Flagship 
Project on Innovation, Culture, Biogenetic Resources, and Traditional Knowledge, U.N. 
Development Programme (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Author). 
 289. See generally Basheer & Primi, supra note 277. 
 290. Reichman, Watal & Okediji, supra note 288; see also Chon, supra note 37, at 
80620 (probing the relationship between IP law and social justice); Maskus & Reichman, 
supra note 2, at 24 (These countries can hardly absorb the unknown social costs of new 
intellectual property burdens when the real costs of the last round of legislative initiatives 
are still making themselves felt.). 
 291. See Reichman, Watal & Okediji, supra note 288. 
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positions in the relevant multilateral fora, including WIPO, 
WTO, WHO, UNCTAD, and UNESCO.292 
To their credit, UNCTAD sponsored a conference in Ghana at 
which some sixteen delegations from different countries evaluated 
these proposals. Notwithstanding the attending delegations 
enthusiastic endorsement of these proposals, and UNCTADs 
strong commitment to promoting their implementation, further 
UNDP funding was denied. The project was soon abandoned, in 
part because some high-level UNDP officials thought that 
developing countries should work to repeal the TRIPS Agreement 
rather than to comply with it, and in partone suspectsdue to 
pressures on UNDP from key donor countries to steer clear of 
controversial intellectual property matters. 
In retrospect, both Carolyn Deeres and Laurence Helfers 
empirical findings demonstrate the validity of the proposals for 
interagency coordination that were put forward in the late 1990s 
and the extent to which such recommendations still remain 
relevant to todays counter-harmonization strategies, including 
efforts to implement the WIPO Development Agenda. Deeres 
study shows that those BRIC countries that were most successful 
in defining and maintaining autonomous intellectual property 
policies and positions over time, especially India and Brazil, 
despite enormous pressures from foreign governments, were 
precisely those countries that had highly developed interagency 
coordination mechanisms in place early on.293 
In this connection, it is worth noting that Chinas third 
amendment of its Patent Law in 2008, which self-consciously 
seeks to balance incentives to innovate with the larger public 
interest, was the product of a high-level policymaking group 
charged with the formulation of a National Intellectual Property 
Strategy.294 
                                                          
 292. See Peter K. Yu, Building Intellectual Property Coalitions for Development, in 
IMPLEMENTING THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATIONS DEVELOPMENT 
AGENDA, supra note 78, at 79, 9093 (Regional or pro-development fora are particularly 
effective means for coordinating efforts by less developed countries in the areas of public 
health, IP, and international trade.). 
 293. With the exception of a handful of countries, like Brazil and India, the 
prospect of tailored approaches to TRIPS implementation was curtailed by the 
absence of a broader policy framework setting out national needs and priorities 
through which reform options could be considered. . . . Among developing 
countries, Brazil stood out for having a strategic approach to TRIPS 
implementation based on a broad policy framework for development and 
associated industrial policies. India also worked to place IP issues within a 
broader policy framework through its five-year plans. 
DEERE, supra note 30, at 199. 
 294. Feng, supra note 9, at 1011. 
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Elsewhere, Professor Helfers research team shows that the 
Andean Communitys own intellectual property rules 
significantly influenced the expectations and behavior of private 
actors.295 By the same token, the Andean Tribunal of Justice 
(ATJ) not only created the kind of procedures and standards 
familiar in well-functioning legal systems, it helped to rebuff 
pressure by the United States and multinational corporations to 
circumvent Andean IP rules, leading to different behavior by 
national actors from what it would have been in the absence of 
the Andean legal system.296 
In contrast, most other governments delegated the task of 
responding to TRIPS and drafting the relevant laws to a small 
staff of technocrats located in national intellectual property 
offices.297 Carried to the regional level in Africa, for example, this 
meant that national intellectual property policies were largely 
delegated to the African Intellectual Property Organization 
(OAPI) and to the African Regional Intellectual Property 
Organization (ARIPO) (English-speaking countries). Both 
entities worked closely with WIPO and left few countries at the 
national level with sufficient capacity . . . to critically review 
patents granted, among other policy issues.298 
Of course, the successes attained in India, Brazil, and China 
were also due to the economic opportunities their large markets 
offered to foreign investors, irrespective of their own intellectual 
property laws and policies.299 Nevertheless, it seems clear that 
without effective interagency coordination of these issues at the 
domestic level, developing countries will not attain the leadership 
role in intellectual property policymaking at the international 
level to which they otherwise could and should aspire.300 
                                                          
 295. Helfer et al., supra note 47, at 1732. 
 296. Id. at 17. 
 297. DEERE, supra note 30, at 199; see, e.g., COMMN ON INTELL. PROP. RIGHTS, 
INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 5 (2003), 
available at http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final_report/CIPRfullfinal.pdf; 
Carlos Correa, Formulating Effective Pro-development National Intellectual Property 
Strategies, in TRADING KNOWLEDGE: DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES ON TRIPS, TRADE AND 
SUSTAINABILITY 209, 214 (Christophe Bellman et al. eds., 2003) (Due to their limited 
domestic capacity, developing countries are strongly dependent on technical assistance, and 
rely for expert advice and commentary on new draft legislation on the [WIPO] and the [WTO], 
especially to conform consistency of draft legislation with international obligations.). 
 298. DEERE, supra note 30, at 219. 
 299. See Yu, supra note 8, at 17780. 
 300. For the view that the United States own interagency review mechanisms no longer 
meet todays needs for a vibrant and effective innovation policy, see Stuart Minor Benjamin & 
Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 38 
(2008) (highlighting certain well-established pathologies of the regulatory state). 
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B. Establishing Facts on the Ground 
The Development Agenda, now officially established at 
WIPO301 and analogous forums at other institutions, such as the 
IGWG deliberations at WHO302 and their progeny,303 have 
changed the policy climate at the international level. They 
elevate the concerns of developing countries, as well as the 
broader constituencies in developed countries that they indirectly 
represent, to a level of importance that cannot be ignored.304 They 
make the implementation of the flexibilities set out in the TRIPS 
Agreement and in other intellectual property conventions as 
much a matter of legitimate multilateral concern as compliance 
with proprietors exclusive rights.  
In this respect, users rights and other third party interests, 
including the larger public interest in research, education, and 
access to knowledge, have become an integral part of the relevant 
                                                          
 301. WIPO, General Report Adopted by the Assemblies of the Member States of WIPO, 
at 13547, WIPO Doc. A/43/16 (Nov. 12, 2007), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/ 
mdocs/govbody/en/a_43/a_43_16-main1.pdf; see, e.g., Denis Borges Barbosa, Margaret 
Chon & Andrés Moncayo von Hase, Slouching Towards Development in International 
Intellectual Property, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 71, 12023 (addressing the purpose and 
constraints of the WIPO Development Agenda); de Beer, supra note 78, at 12. 
 302. World Health Org. [WHO], Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health, 
Innovation and Intellectual Property, WHO Doc. WHA 61.21 (May 24, 2008), available at 
http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/A61/A61_R21-en.pdf (building upon the report of 
the Intergovernmental Working Group on Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual 
Property).  
 303. See, e.g., WHO, Draft Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health, 
Innovation and Intellectual Property: Mapping the Funding for Research and Development 
for Neglected Diseases, WHO Doc. A/PHI/IGWG/2/INF.DOC./2 (Aug. 28, 2007), available 
at http://apps.who.int/gb/phi/pdf/igwg2/PHI_IGWG2_ID2-en.pdf (reporting on the funding 
for health research and development of research related to neglected diseases); WHO, 
STRENGTHENING HEALTH SYSTEMS TO IMPROVE HEALTH OUTCOMES: WHOS FRAMEWORK 
FOR ACTION 15 (2007), available at http://www.searo.who.int/LinkFiles/Health_Systems_ 
EverybodyBusinessHSS.pdf (noting the unacceptable health outcomes across the 
developing world and providing a framework to strengthen health systems to reverse this 
trend); WHO, EQUITABLE ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES: A FRAMEWORK FOR 
COLLECTIVE ACTION 16 (2004), available at http://archives.who.int/tbs/ndp/s4962e.pdf 
(proposing actions for policymakers to take to improve access to existing essential 
medicines and vaccines). 
 304. See, e.g., Carolyn Deere, Reforming Governance to Advance the WIPO 
Development Agenda, in IMPLEMENTING THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
ORGANIZATIONS DEVELOPMENT AGENDA, supra note 78, at 43, 4346 (critically evaluating 
WIPOs governance); Xuan Li, A Conceptual and Methodological Framework for Impact 
Assessment Under the WIPO Development Agenda (Cluster D), in IMPLEMENTING THE 
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATIONS DEVELOPMENT AGENDA, supra note 78, 
at 34, 40; see also E. Richard Gold & Jean-Frédéric Morin, From Agenda to 
Implementation: Working Outside the WIPO Box, in IMPLEMENTING THE WORLD 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATIONS DEVELOPMENT AGENDA, supra note 78, at 57, 
6466 (encouraging WIPO to outsource the implementation of the Development 
Agenda). 
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international intellectual property standards set out in these 
conventions.305 Moreover, by linking the larger development 
component to questions of enforcing intellectual property 
standards at the international level, the Development Agenda 
and IGWG-related consultations make it mandatory for both 
IGOs and national delegations to take into account the 
countervailing demands of the human rights conventions,306 as 
well as the expressly designated objectives and principles codified 
in Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement.307 
Yet, nothing is cheaper than talk at IGOs. The prospects of 
top-down multilateral legislation mandating hard law provisions 
favoring the interests of developing countries are virtually nil at 
the present time, given the governance structure of these 
organizations and the hostility of the United States, European 
Union, and Japan to any such initiatives. Whether soft law 
reforms stand a better chance of approval remains to be seen,308 
including the social costs of any trade-offs that would have to be 
made in order to win the assent of the aforementioned developed 
countries.309 
Meanwhile, secret provisions likely to be incorporated into 
the pending Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) 
                                                          
 305. See HUGENHOLTZ & OKEDIJI, supra note 180, at 915 (suggesting that 
international harmonization of limitations and exceptions in copyright law would enhance 
the benefits of substantive rights harmonization); Dreyfuss, supra note 180, at 22 
(making a case for adding explicit user rights to the TRIPS Agreement); Annette Kur & 
Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Enough is EnoughThe Notion of Binding Ceilings in 
International Intellectual Property Protection 1925 (Max Planck Inst. for Intellectual 
Prop., Competition & Tax Law Research Paper Series, Paper No. 09-01, 2008), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1326429; Three-Step Test, supra note 180, at 1 (observing the 
need for the Three-Step Test to be interpreted so as to ensure a proper and balanced 
application of limitations and exceptions). 
 306. See Laurence R. Helfer, Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or 
Coexistence?, 5 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 47, 5557 (2003) (discussing the antagonistic 
approach to TRIPS taken by the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights in Resolution 2000/7 on Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights); 
Helfer, supra note 219, at 100914; see also JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 30405, 309 (2003) (discussing the Vienna Conventions 
objective of prohibiting agreements that affect the rights or obligations of third parties, 
which extends to those agreements that detract[ ] from substantive human rights); 
Thomas Cottier, Joost Pauwelyn & Elisabeth Bürgi, Introduction to HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Thomas Cottier et al. eds., 2005).  
 307. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, arts. 78; see generally Yu, supra note 211. 
 308. See HUGENHOLTZ & OKEDIJI, supra note 180, at 4950 (expounding the benefits 
of a soft-law modality). 
 309. For example, while expanded protection for Geographical Indications and 
perhaps some forms of traditional knowledge might become acceptable to both sides, 
proposals for database protection or deep patent law harmonization would almost 
certainly cost developing countries far more than any gains from greater recognition of so-
called user rights. See Reichman & Dreyfuss, supra note 12, at 9394. 
(4) REICHMAN 12/22/2009 10:14:45 PM 
1174 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [46:4 
negotiations310 could undo key provisions of the Doha Declaration 
on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health.311 EU customs 
officials are further undermining access to medicines by 
intercepting shipments of unpatented generic pharmaceuticals 
from India to developing countries in other continents.312 And 
WIPO has hosted a major conference to convince least-developed 
countries, such as Haiti, that their future economic prospects 
depend on stronger intellectual property laws, which they are 
otherwise not obliged to enact until at least 2013.313 
What must occur, instead, if the WIPO Development Agenda 
is to produce more than talk,314 is that leading developing 
countries, especially the BRIC countries, take steps to implement 
model TRIPS-compliant flexibilities in their own domestic laws, 
while championing these same positions in the relevant 
international fora. China, for example, has articulated the 
public order exception to patentability under Article 27.2 of the 
TRIPS Agreement to exclude any invention-creation that is 
contrary to the laws of the State or social morality or that is 
detrimental to the public interest.315 Building on this provision, 
Chinas third revision of its Patent Law regulates access to 
genetic resources for the first time;316 imposes a prior informed 
                                                          
 310. See generally Charles R. McManis, The Proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA): Two Tales of a Treaty, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1235 (2009) (describing what 
is known of the closed-door trade negotiations surrounding ACTA, an agreement 
ostensibly aimed at fighting the proliferation of counterfeit and pirated goods in 
international trade). 
 311. See Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 31. 
 312. Posting of Tom Bollyky, Terminology Matters: The Dispute Between India and 
EU over Generic Drug Transshipments, to Global Health Policy Blog (Aug. 12, 2009), 
http://blogs.cgdev.org/globalhealth/2009/08/terminology-matters-the-dispute-between-
india-and-eu-over-generic-drug-transshipments.php; Kaitlin Mara, Drug Seizures in 
Frankfurt Spark Fears of EU-Wide Pattern, INTELL. PROP. WATCH, June 5, 2009, 
http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2009/06/05/drug-seizures-in-frankfurt-spark-fears-of-eu-
wide-pattern; see also Abbott & Reichman, supra note 38, at 966 (reporting that the EU 
had been effectively seeking to burden countries with the duty to implement the terms 
of its Intellectual Property Enforcement Directive, by ordering provisional measures such 
as the physical seizure of infringing goods). 
 313. See supra note 31. 
 314. See Pedro de Paranaguá Moniz, The Development Agenda for WIPO: Another 
Stillbirth? A Battle Between Access to Knowledge and Enclosure 4142 (July 1, 2005) 
(unpublished L.L.M. thesis, Queen Mary & Westfield College), http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=844366 (criticizing long discussions as irrelevant to the main goals of the 
Development Agenda). 
 315. See Wenting Cheng, Third Revision of Patent Law in China (Part II), INTELL. 
PROP. WATCH, Oct. 1, 2009, http://ip-watch.org/weblog/2009/10/01/third-revision-of-patent-
law-in-china-part-ii. 
 316. Id. Draft regulations define genetic resources as any material that is obtained 
from the human body, animals, plants or micro-organism, contains a genetic functional 
unit, and is of actual or potential value. Inventions subject to the provision make . . . use 
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consent regime consistent with the Convention on Biological 
Diversity;317 and makes disclosure of origin a precondition for the 
granting of any patented invention depending on genetic 
resources.318 These provisions were adopted to deal with the 
problem of biopiracy and modeled on similar legislation in the 
Andean Community and India.319  
In contrast with these palpable concerns about protecting 
potentially valuable genetic resources, the BRIC countries as a 
group lag behind in recognizing impediments to computational 
research methods and innovation that lie hidden in obsolete 
copyright regimes.320 For example, nothing prevents Brazil, India, 
and China from proceeding on their own to codify broad 
limitations and exceptions for digitally integrated scientific 
research, education, and libraries in their domestic laws, as 
stepping stones to broader international action.321 By the same 
token, courts or legislatures in these and other countries could 
begin to implement the Max Planck Institutes Declaration on 
the Three-Step Test in their domestic laws,322 along with selected 
other ceilings on intellectual property rights that have emerged 
from parallel initiatives in the Nordic countries.323 
Only if leading developing countries begin to enact suitable 
reforms of intellectual property law and policy at home will it 
                                                          
of the genetic function of genetic resources. Id. 
 317. Id.; see Convention on Biological Diversity arts. 1, 1516, June 5, 1992, 1760 
U.N.T.S. 79, 143 (promoting the sharing in a fair and equitable way the results of 
research and development and the benefits arising from the commercial and other 
utilization of genetic resources). 
 318. Cheng, supra note 315. 
 319. See Feng, supra note 9, at 6364. In China, unauthorized exports of genetic 
materials from wild soybeans, local gooseberry varieties, and even the famous Beijing 
duck had allegedly led to the development of hybrids patented abroad that were 
subsequently imported into China. Cheng, supra note 315. 
 320. See supra text accompanying notes 20005 (suggesting that developing countries 
adopt broad exemptions aimed at promoting scientific research uses of literature and data). 
See generally REICHMAN, DEDEURWAERDERE & UHLIR, supra note 73, chs. 34. 
 321. See, e.g., Reichman & Okediji, supra note 23, at 39; Three-Step Test, supra note 
180, at 3 (prefacing that individual states should have flexibility to shape their own 
copyright laws and stating that the three-step test should not undermine European 
legislation on limitations); see also Andrew Rens, Implementing WIPOs Development 
Agenda: Treaty Provisions on Minimum Exceptions and Limitations for Education, in 
IMPLEMENTING THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATIONS DEVELOPMENT 
AGENDA, supra note 78, at 158, 16061 (pointing out that [e]xceptions and limitations 
already exist in the laws of most developed countries and many developing countries and, 
in particular, arguing for copyright exceptions for educational purposes). But lobbying 
pressures against change in the pending Brazilian copyright reform are reportedly fierce, 
according to confidential top-level sources. 
 322. See Three-Step Test, supra note 180, at 3 ([T]he Test may be incorporated directly 
or it may function exclusively as an aid to the interpretation of domestic legislation.). 
 323. See Kur & Grosse Ruse-Khan, supra note 305, at 26 n.89. 
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become realistically possible to foresee these reforms spreading 
to the regional and multilateral levels, where both positive and 
negative results of such experiments could be evaluated. Just as 
the AIPPI forums in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries shed a comparative light on state practice in developed 
countries and led to the progressive harmonization of inventors 
rights over time,324 so, too, can the WIPO Development Agenda 
become a focal point for comparing and contrasting diverse state 
actions on the road to achieving a new and better equilibrium 
between private and public goods at the national, regional, and 
multilateral levels. 
Meanwhile, still other worthwhile initiatives can be rooted 
in state practice without formal acquiescence at IGOs. For 
example, there are now real prospects for an international treaty 
providing greater access to literature for the blind,325 a process 
that is long overdue and worthy of strong support by all WIPO 
member countries. At the same time, nothing stops the 
developing countries from immediately codifying key provisions 
of this proposed treaty in order to create facts on the ground 
that would benefit the blind now and pave the way for future 
enactment in the WIPO framework.  
Similarly, if a prize fund to promote research on a vaccine 
for Chagas disease is a good idea, as the evidence suggests,326 
then the Latin American countries should establish such a fund 
now, with their own contributions, and shame the developed 
countries into joining them later. In other words, the more that 
the developing countries are willing to stand up for their own 
intellectual property needs, the more likely they are to ensure 
that those needs will be respected in future international 
intellectual property lawmaking exercises. 
C. Defending the TRIPS Flexibilities at the WTO 
Moving beyond talk will not become feasible unless 
developing countries are willing to defend their rights to 
                                                          
 324. See LADAS, supra note 44, at 6394 (chronicling the development of the Paris 
Convention). 
 325. WIPO, Treaty for Improved Access for Blind, Visually Impaired and Other 
Reading Disabled Persons, Annex, WIPO Doc. SCCR/18/5 (May 25, 2009), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_18/sccr_18_5.pdf (proposal put forward 
by Brazil, Ecuador, and Paraguay based on recommendations of the World Blind Union); 
William New, Proposed WIPO Treaty on Visually Impaired Access Gets Deeper Look, 
INTELL. PROP. WATCH, May 29, 2009, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2009/05/29/ 
proposed-wipo-treaty-on-visually-impaired-access-gets-deeper-look. 
 326. See Sara E. Crager & Matt Price, Prizes and Parasites: Incentive Models for 
Addressing Chagas Disease, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 292, 30001 (2009). 
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implement the TRIPS flexibilities in their own domestic laws 
without undue interference from powerful states that espouse 
conflicting interpretations of international IP standards. The 
more that single states, such as the BRIC countries, or regional 
coalitions, take steps to fully implement limitations and 
exceptions to the exclusive rights covered by the TRIPS 
Agreement, for example, the more likely it becomes that 
governments in developed countries will contest the legality of 
such actions through diplomatic representations and threats of 
retaliatory measures.  
The USTR has repeatedly used actions under Section 301 of 
the Trade Act of 1974327 to challenge developing country 
governments interpretations of the TRIPS Agreement, in 
combination with threats to withdraw GSP privileges in 
reprisal.328 These tactics aimed to keep developing countries from 
using compulsory licenses to persuade pharmaceutical companies 
to market patented medicines on a high-volume low-margin 
basis329 rather than at prices only the affluent can afford.330 
Unless public officials in developing countries are willing to 
stand up for their rights under the TRIPS Agreement and related 
conventions before the TRIPS Council331 and, where necessary, in 
WTO dispute-resolution proceedings,332 they will not retain the 
                                                          
 327. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 301, 88 Stat. 1978, 204142 (1975) 
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2006)). 
 328. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2009 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 3, 17, 23 
(2009), available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Full%20Version%20of%20the% 
202009%20SPECIAL%20301%20REPORT.pdf (noting that Argentina and Brazil 
appear on the Priority Watch and Watch Lists, respectively, as targets for 
enforcement through trade preference programs such as the Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP)). 
 329. See Bird, supra note 47, at 210, 214 ([L]icenses invite scrutiny by wealthy 
governments ready to defend their multinationals through trade sanctions. . . . Evidence 
certainly exists that compulsory licensing, or even the threat of compulsory licensing, can 
lower drug prices dramatically.); Kristina M. Lybecker & Elisabeth Fowler, Compulsory 
Licensing in Canada and Thailand: Comparing Regimes to Ensure Legitimate Use of the 
WTO Rules, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 222, 233 (2009); see also Abbott & Reichman, supra 
note 38, at 92930; Bryan C. Mercurio, TRIPs, Patents, and Access to Life-Saving Drugs 
in the Developing World, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 211, 224 (2004); Outterson, supra 
note 38, at 22930. 
 330. See Flynn, Hollis & Palmedo, supra note 236, at 186 (describing the use of 
monopoly pricing in under-developed pharmaceutical markets). 
 331. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 68; Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization art. IV, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Legal InstrumentsResults of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 
1125 (1994) (designating the roles and duties of the TRIPS Council). 
 332. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 
2, Legal InstrumentsResults of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter 
DSU].  
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full policy space in which to maneuver that these conventions 
actually afford.333 Conversely, governments that do stand up for 
such rights stand a good chance of persuading the WTO 
Appellate Body that unilateral actions taken against them 
violate fundamental WTO precepts. 
Article 23 of the WTOs Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(DSU) obliges Members to seek redress for alleged violations of the 
WTO Agreement, including its TRIPS component, by means of 
specified multilateral venues and procedures.334 Under this 
provision, the U.S. authorities can challenge a developing 
countrys interpretation of its TRIPS obligations by initiating 
litigation before a dispute settlement panel, with a right of appeal 
to the WTO Appellate Body. But the USTR cannot unilaterally 
adjudicate disputes over matters covered by the TRIPS 
Agreement, nor can it legally impose sanctions for the loss of its 
expected trade benefits.335 Freedom from unilateral action of this 
kind is one major reason that developing countries signed onto the 
1994 agreement establishing the WTO in the first place.336 
In 1999, a WTO panel convoked by European Union officials 
criticized the United States for unilaterally applying Section 301 
to TRIPS-related matters, and it warned that sanctions would be 
in order if such violations continued in the future.337 If developed 
countries continue to engage in unilateral retaliations of this 
sort, they run the further risk of other countervailing measures 
that aggrieved countries could invoke: 
                                                          
 333. See Reichman, supra note 140, at 254 (observing that developing countries are 
hesitant to employ legitimate legal tools and flexibilities contained in the TRIPS 
Agreement when faced with threats of retaliation by powerful countries); Yu, supra note 
208, at 350 (discussing Brazils request for consultation following a dispute settlement 
process with developed countries). But see Gregory Shaffer, Recognizing Public Goods in 
WTO Dispute Settlement: Who Participates? Who Decides? The Case of TRIPS and 
Pharmaceutical Patent Protection, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF 
TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, supra note 2, at 
884, 895901 (describing impediments), 90107 (prescribing strategies to overcome them). 
 334. DSU, supra note 332, art. 23.1. 
 335. The USTR has revoked the GSP privileges against several Latin American countries 
in the past (notably Argentina and Brazil), see supra note 328, and it has threatened Thailand 
with similar actions. Because GSP concessions are voluntary, and not required under the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994), they may normally be revoked at will; 
however, revoking GSP privileges as retaliation for a unilaterally determined violation of a 
TRIPS obligation would seem to violate both the letter and spirit of Article 23 of the DSU. 
MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 434 
(3d ed. 2005); Abbott & Reichman, supra note 38, at 980. 
 336. See UNCTAD-ICTSD, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT 45, 8, 10, 
(2005). 
 337. Panel Report, United StatesSections 301310 of the Trade Act of 1974, 
WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999). At the time, the USTR promised to exercise its power in 
conformity with the DSU. 
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Because such action constitutes a violation of the DSU and 
of the framework Agreement Establishing the WTO, it 
would entitle the aggrieved party to all the remedies that 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides for 
breach of the relevant agreements. A primary remedy thus 
provided is the age-old right of self-help implicit in the 
power of an aggrieved party to suspend its obligations 
under the treaty in question, pending compensation for 
breach.338 
Developing countries that win dispute settlement cases against 
developed countries may also invoke cross-collateral trade 
sanctions in the event that damages based on sanctions against 
imports of knowledge goods alone were insufficient to cover the 
actual trade losses caused by the defendant countrys violations 
of the WTO Agreements.339 
Those developing countries willing to defend their 
interpretations of the TRIPS Agreement before WTO dispute 
settlement panels have already made significant contributions to 
our understanding of international intellectual property law. For 
example, in the very first WTO TRIPS case concerning a dispute 
between the United States and the European Union on one side 
and India on the other, the Appellate Body, while finding against 
India on the merits, rejected the interpretation put forward by 
the plaintiffs.340 Instead, the Appellate Body stressed the need for 
deference to the manner in which states undertook good faith 
implementation of TRIPS obligations within their domestic legal 
systems, in keeping with Article 1.1 of the TRIPS Agreement 
itself.341 
                                                          
 338. Reichman, supra note 140, at 259 (footnotes omitted); see Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties art. 60, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 33 (permitting suspension of 
treaty obligations when one party materially breaches a multilateral treaty). 
 339. See, e.g., UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 336, at 682 (discussing cross-
retaliation in the form of trade sanctions by suspension of concessions); Henning Grosse 
Ruse-Khan, A Pirate of the Caribbean? The Attractions of Suspending TRIPS 
Obligations, 11 J. INTL ECON. L. 313, 31618 (2008) (recounting a WTO Panel decision 
allowing Antigua to request suspension of its TRIPS obligations in response to the 
United States refusal to comply with a prior DSB order to cease interference with 
Antiguas gambling and betting services); see also Catherine Saez, WTO Ruling on 
Brazil-US Cotton Opens Door to Cross-Retaliation Against IP Rights, INTELL. PROP. 
WATCH, Sept. 7, 2009, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2009/09/07/wto-ruling-on-brazil-
cotton-opens-door-to-cross-retaliation-against-ip-rights (describing the DSBs 
authorization of Brazil to take cross-collateral trade sanctions against the United 
States for illegal cotton subsidies). 
 340. Appellate Body Report, IndiaPatent Protection for Pharmaceutical and 
Agricultural Chemical Products, ¶¶ 58, 84, WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997). 
 341. Id. ¶¶ 46, 59; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 1.1 (Members shall be free 
to determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement 
within their own legal system and practice.); see Jerome H. Reichman, Securing 
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More recently, in a dispute about the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights between China and the United 
States, the panels decision on the merits went both ways, 
depending on the specific issues.342 Nevertheless, as Professor 
Dreyfuss points out, the panel gave China extensive leeway to 
determine how to dispose of infringing goods and where to set the 
threshold for criminal enforcement, while stressing that TRIPS 
is a minimum standards regime . . . that gives members freedom 
to determine the most appropriate method of implementing their 
obligations.343 Professor Dreyfuss thus predicts that greater 
participation of the emerging countries in the WTO adjudication 
process would likely push both panels and the Appellate Body to 
more carefully scrutinize the balancing factors favoring 
developing country interests that are already built into the 
TRIPS Agreement than has so far occurred in cases where the 
only antagonists are developed country Members.344 
V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
While much of the recent literature continues to focus on two 
fundamental tenets of the high-protectionist rhetoric, namely 
that stronger IPRs necessarily lead to more innovation and more 
transfer of technology and that they are essential for attracting 
FDI,345 other studies have demonstrated that technology 
exporters need access to emerging Asian and Latin American 
markets as much as these countries need FDI, licensing, and up 
to date high-tech goods.346 So long as the general level of IP 
protection in emerging markets affords technology exporters the 
                                                          
Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement After US v India, 1 J. INTL ECON. L. 585, 596 
(1998) (Deference to local law and strict construction of treaties have thus become the 
pedestal on which the Appellate Bodys TRIPS jurisprudence rests.); see also Dreyfuss, 
supra note 3, at 1516. 
 342. Panel Report, ChinaMeasures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights, ¶¶ 8.1.4, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009) [hereinafter China 
Enforcement of IP]. 
 343. Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 16; see China Enforcement of IP, supra note 342, 
¶ 7.236. 
 344. Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 17. 
 345. See CHEUNG, supra note 277, at 8; Gervais, supra note 5, at 237172; Yu, supra 
note 8, at 17678; supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 346. See Daniel C.K. Chow, Counterfeiting in the Peoples Republic of China, 78 
WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 47, 49 (2000) (asserting that foreign brand owners invest in Chinas 
economy, in part due to the market for counterfeit products); Yu, supra note 8, at 175, 180 
(arguing that foreign investors are attracted to China because of low production costs and 
market potential). See generally Keith E. Maskus, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights 
in Encouraging Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Transfer, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & 
INTL L. 109 (1998) (noting the large amount of foreign investment in Latin American 
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minimum standards and entrepreneurial options available under 
the TRIPS Agreement, these exporters will find ways to reach 
attractive markets, and would-be purchasers in developing 
countries can usually meet their needs through sound 
procurement strategies. 
Specific bottlenecks are more likely to arise from refusals 
to deal, excessive pricing, territorial restraints on outputs, and 
other restrictive business practices that suitable competition 
laws and policies could help to resolve than from gaps or 
inadequacies in local intellectual property laws.347 Even so, the 
weak enforcement of IP laws may have detrimental effects on 
both local and foreign producers.348 Meanwhile, innovative 
firms benefiting from a pro-competitive environment in 
developing countries can also profit from high-protectionist IP 
regimes abroadunder the independence of patents 
doctrine349without aping the protectionist excesses of those 
regimes. 
As Keith Maskus has explained, IP regimes are but one 
component of a healthy development-oriented economy. Without 
an appropriate infrastructure that includes corporate law, 
bankruptcy law, and a solid educational system, among other 
variables, IP protection may add little to either FDI or economic 
growth in its own right.350 Moreover, as the relations between 
IPRs and innovation in knowledge economies become better 
scrutinized, the proper role of IPRs as such in overall 
development policies remains far less clear and more complex 
than the IP literature normally recognizes.351  
Policies favoring the formation of scientific research 
commons, as well as open access to knowledge initiatives, may 
become as important in the BRIC countries, especially for 
sustainable upstream knowledge outputs, as strategic reliance 
on exclusive rights to stimulate downstream commercial 
                                                          
 347. See supra notes 23943, 25354 and accompanying text. 
 348. See, e.g., CHEUNG, supra note 277, at 26, 31; Chow, supra note 346, at 51. 
 349. See Paris Convention, supra note 88, art. 4bis (Patents applied for . . . shall be 
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 350. MASKUS, supra note 1, at 20003. 
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Property Norm Setting and Interpretation, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND 
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 8, at 475, 48891 ([L]ittle . . . reflection takes place within 
intellectual property about its relationship to development law . . . . [T]he international 
intellectual property framework must begin to incorporate the alternate model of 
development as freedom.); Stiglitz, supra note 234, at 31819. 
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applications of basic research.352 Unless these countries actively 
adapt the TRIPS Agreements flexibilities to their own 
development needs, with a view to maximizing the benefits and 
minimizing the social costs of harmonized international IP 
standards,353 they may end up financing not just or even 
primarily their own growth, but promoting the economic growth 
of developed countries, possibly to the detriment of their own 
economic development.354 
Against this background, the high- and middle-income 
developing countries, as a group, are well positioned to undertake 
a leadership role in adapting traditional intellectual property law 
to the new technological conditions and challenges that the 
OECD countries have increasingly failed to address.355 To the 
extent that these emerging economies avoid the pitfalls that have 
begun to undermine markets for technology in the United States 
and the European Union, fashioning a more flexible, balanced, 
and modern approach to intellectual property law could in fact 
enable them to boost their growing comparative advantages in 
cutting-edge technologies well beyond current levels.356 To 
achieve this result, however, will require developing country 
governments to self-consciously adopt disciplined legal and 
political strategies that preserve the policy space in which to 
devise and test their own intellectual property institutions and to 
stimulate a vigorous and concerted debate about the proper 
design of those same institutions.357  
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Legal circles in the emerging economies will also have to 
study and master the relevant WTO jurisprudence, as the 
Japanese did at an earlier period,358 in order to steer clear of 
obvious legal obstacles and to defend national autonomy at the 
TRIPS Council or, when necessary, in actual dispute settlement 
cases. These countries should also avoid further multilateral and 
bilateral standard-setting negotiations likely to limit their own 
autonomy and governance capacities, while at the same time 
seeking to forge regional understandings on these same issues 
that could attenuate the pressures from abroad.359 Above all, most 
developing countries still need to establish solid interagency 
review mechanisms that can exercise oversight of their 
intellectual property bureaus and ensure that the latter properly 
implement national innovation policies established at the highest 
levels of government.360 
From a broader perspective, any uniquely developing 
country effort to fashion appropriate intellectual property 
regimes for the twenty-first century must necessarily seek a new 
equilibrium between public and private goods. Because the last 
half of the twentieth century was so consumed with conflicts 
between public-centered and private-centered economies, 
insufficient thought was given to evaluating the proper and ever-
evolving interrelationship between private and public goods, 
which the rise of knowledge economies has made so critically 
important.361 In this context, Joseph Stiglitzs call to recognize the 
role of knowledge as a global public good362 has generated an 
important literature whose practical implementation should 
become a primary goal of forward-looking policymakers in all 
developing countries.363 
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These countries should also build ever stronger 
connections to the worldwide flow of scientific and technical 
information, a task that will require sharing locally generated 
scientific data with the rest of the world (as China has begun 
to do),364 while resisting legal, economic, and technological 
restraints on the dissemination of such data.365 A particularly 
forward-looking policy would, for example, lead developing 
countries to support open access and other sharing 
mechanisms at the level of scientific enquiry,366 while taking 
steps to better ensure downstream support for innovative 
applications flowing from cooperative publicprivate upstream 
research initiatives. 
If, at the end of the twentieth century, we learned that 
access to knowledge was as important for economic growth and 
human welfare as stimulating investment in the production of 
knowledge goods, it could be the developing countries as a group 
that lead us out of certain blind alleys that currently pit these 
two essential policy goals against one another. It is, as 
Professor Dreyfuss and I have recently argued, precisely a 
time for experimentation, and not a time to copy or codify 
obsolete approaches that are likely to boomerang against the 
long-term interests of the very developed countries that are 
most avidly pushing the harmonization buttons at the 
international level.367 
To be sure, charting ones own course is never easy, 
especially when powerful countries and knowledge cartels apply 
countervailing pressures at every step. Nevertheless, I continue 
to believe that, with enlightened leadership, buttressed by 
skillful lawyering, political determination and coordinated 
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planning,368 the intellectual property institutions inherited from 
the Industrial Revolution can evolve into a worldwide system of 
innovation that will benefit countries at every stage of economic 
development. 
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